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 Scholars examining the use of historical practice in constitutional 
adjudication have focused on a few high-profile separation-of-powers 
disputes, such as the recent decisions in NLRB v. Noel Canning and 
Zivotofsky v. Kerry. This essay argues that “big cases make bad theory”— 
that the focus on high-profile cases of this type distorts our understanding 
of how historical practice figures in constitutional adjudication more 
generally. I shift focus here to the more prosaic terrain of federal courts 
law, in which practice plays a pervasive role. That shift reveals two 
important insights: First, while historical practice plays an important 
constitutive role, structuring and filling gaps in the judicial architecture, 
that practice is, in contrast to the practices in Noel Canning and Zivotofsky, 
rarely entrenched against ordinary legal change. Second, the authority of 
historical practice in high-profile separation-of-powers disputes generally 
rests on a theory of acquiescence by one branch in the other’s actions; the 
federal courts cases, in contrast, ignore acquiescence and instead ground 
practice’s authority in its longstanding observance. 
 The use of historical practice in federal courts law rests on a theory 
of prescription—that is, past practice derives authority from its sheer past-
ness. This essay explores the centrality of prescription in Burkean political 
theory and suggests that cases relying on past practices can contribute to 
the development of a distinctively Burkean theory of constitutional law. This 
theory suggests that past practice plays an important constitutive role, but 
as in the federal courts cases, that role is not entrenched against ordinary 
legal change. The fact that historical practice is not entrenched—and can 
be changed through democratic processes—helps to answer several key 
criticisms of relying on practice in constitutional adjudication. 
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 A spate of recent, high-profile separation of powers cases at the Supreme Court has 
turned a spotlight on courts’ reliance on historical practice in constitutional cases. In NLRB 
v. Noel Canning,1 the Court looked to the practice of past Presidents and Congresses in 
resolving three questions about the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause. Likewise, 
in Zivotofsky v. Kerry,2 the Court relied on Executive practice and Congress’s acquiescence 
to determine that Congress may not regulate the President’s power to recognize (or not 
recognize) the territorial claims of foreign governments. These and other cases have 
prompted an outpouring of scholarship concerning the courts’ reliance on historical 
practice outside the usual parameters of originalist interpretation—that is, the use of 
historical practices that are not evidence of the Founders’ intentions or understandings but 
that nonetheless may help resolve disputed questions of constitutional meaning.3 
 In this article, I suggest that high-profile disputes over the separation of powers can 
tell us only part of the story concerning the role of historical practice in constitutional 
analysis. I shift focus from separation of powers disputes to the somewhat more prosaic 
terrain of federal courts law.4 That field, to be sure, has its share of high-stakes inter-branch 
confrontations—for example, over Congress’s authority to restrict the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction.5 But federal courts doctrine often looks to historical practice in less dramatic 
ways. Consider, for example, a typical civil rights suit against a state officer under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. In adjudicating such a case, a court is likely to frame the plaintiff’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in terms of common social practices;6 to look to 
                                                 
1 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (holding that the Recess Appointments Clause permits appointments during both 
inter- and intra-session recesses and covers vacancies that arise prior to the recess, but does not permit 
appointments when the Senate is in pro forma session). 
2 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (holding that Congress may not require the Secretary of State to designate “Israel” 
as the place of birth on a passport issued to a citizen born in Jerusalem, in contravention of Executive policy). 
3 See, e.g. Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016); 
Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional 
Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2015); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss 
and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012). 
4 By “federal courts” law, I mean the body of law governing the jurisdiction and remedial powers of the 
federal judiciary, as well as that judiciary’s interaction with state law and state courts. See generally Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 961-63 (1994) 
(discussing the somewhat fuzzy boundaries of the federal courts field). I also construe the term broadly to 
include recurrent institutional problems arising in federal litigation, such as the courts’ stance toward statutes 
and their own precedents. These are not exclusively problems of federal courts law, but they are much-
discussed in that field. 
5 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (striking down restrictions on judicial review of 
determinations that Guantanamo Bay detainees were enemy combatants under the Suspension Clause); Ex 
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (upholding restriction on Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to 
review challenge to military reconstruction of the South). 
6 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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common law practice in assessing both the measure of damages7 and the defendant’s 
official immunity;8 and to assess the availability of an injunction against future intrusions 
in light of the traditions of equity.9  
Because it focuses on high-profile separation of powers disputes, the existing 
literature on historical practice in constitutional adjudication tends to ignore the sort of case 
just described. But practice is in fact pervasive in federal courts law. That body of law 
borrows from the common law and equity practice in shaping judicial procedure and 
remedies;10 it employs canons of statutory construction designed, at bottom, to harmonize 
new law with longstanding practice;11 and it structures the intricate relationship between 
the federal and state judicial systems by constant reference to longstanding usage.12 These 
sorts of reliance on past practice differ in important ways from use of practice in cases like 
Noel Canning or Zivotofsky. Practice in federal courts law often bears a different 
relationship to the constitutional text, for example, and it rests on a different justificatory 
rationale. I submit that we miss a lot about historical practice by focusing only on the high-
profile cases. One might thus sum up the line taken here as “Big cases make bad theory”—
or at least incomplete theory. 
 Shifting the focus to federal courts law and the judicial power entails a second 
analytical move as well. This essay considers a variety of ways in which historical practices 
influence judicial decision—including judges’ reliance on past precedents, their 
incorporation of preexisting common law or equitable doctrines to fill numerous gaps in 
our procedural and remedial regime, and the employment of canons of statutory 
construction—that are subconstitutional in nature. One might say that these practices are 
all “constitutional” in that they involve constructions of the “judicial power” recognized in 
Article III.13 But while that is true, it also seems a bit too easy. It is more straightforward 
                                                 
7 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978). 
8 See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). 
9 See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903). 
10 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (grounding state sovereign immunity in the English 
common law); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (recognizing private remedies against state officials, 
notwithstanding sovereign immunity, based in part on traditions of equitable relief against government 
officials in English practice). 
11 See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 
(1992). 
12 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S 37 (1971) (relying on longstanding equitable principles to forbid 
federal judicial interference with ongoing state criminal proceedings); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 
(20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (rejecting arguments that an amendment to the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional statute 
was intended to fundamentally alter the relationship between that court and the state courts).  
13 See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900-04 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 
(8th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that stare decisis is part of the meaning of the “judicial power”). 
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to say that these practices each perform a constitutional function—they help constitute the 
judicial power that Article III incompletely specifies—and thus form part of our 
“constitution outside the Constitution.”14 This notion, that the canonical text of the 
Constitution includes only a subset of the principles that constitute our government, goes 
back at least as far as Karl Llewellyn’s idea of a “working constitution” in 1934.15 I build 
on that notion here to suggest that any effort to assess the courts’ reliance on historical 
practice in public law should include not only its use to resolve controversies about the 
constitutional text but also the broader set of practices that constitute much of our working 
system of governance. Federal courts law provides particularly fertile ground for that 
broader assessment. 
 My exploration of the courts’ reliance on historical practice in the context of 
disputes about the judicial power yields two primary conclusions. The first is that using 
such practices to interpret the meaning of particular constitutional terms—which I will call 
historical “gloss”—is probably not the most common or the most important role that 
historical practice plays. When courts use practice to “gloss” a constitutional term, they 
tend to entrench that practice against change through ordinary legal means. Hence, in 
Zivotofsky, the majority read past practice by the President either recognizing or refusing 
to recognize territorial claims of foreign governments as a gloss on the meaning of 
Executive power, such that Congress could not regulate that practice by statute.16 
Constitutionalizing past practices dramatically raises the stakes of that kind of 
interpretation and may create all sorts of perverse incentives.  
Much use of practice in federal courts law, however, supplements the text by filling 
in the many gaps in Article III’s plan for the judicial system. Critically, historical practice 
that supplements the constitutional text need not be—and generally is not—itself 
constitutionally entrenched. The jurisprudential literature on constitutional functions 
distinguishes between the constitutive function (establishing, empowering, and limiting 
governmental institutions) and the entrenchment function (immunizing those institutions 
from change through ordinary legal processes).17 Much—but not all—of the historical 
usage pervading federal courts law performs a constitutive function but remains subject to 
change through ordinary legislation. Current law’s borrowing of common law principles 
                                                 
14 Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L. J. 408 (2007). 
15 Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934). The notion that a 
constitution functionally includes all the legal materials that define, facilitate, and constrain a government’s 
exercise of its powers is commonplace in British law, which has long defined the “Constitution” as simply 
the sum of these materials. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 22 (8th ed. 1915). 
16 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015). 
17 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152 (Larry Alexander, ed., 1998); Young, Outside the 
Constitution, supra note 14, at 415-28. 
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of official immunity,18 for example, can be changed through statutory enactment. 
Incorporation of historical practice tends to be most controversial where this is not the 
case—where, for example, common law immunities are given entrenched constitutional 
status.19 
 My second point is that reliance on historical practice in federal courts law 
frequently rests on a different justificatory basis than the rationales featured in cases like 
Noel Canning and Zivotofsky. Those cases—and much of the academic literature that has 
grown up around them—speak primarily of rival institutions’ acquiescence in a particular 
branch’s exercise of power.20  Much of the reliance on historical usage that I explore here, 
however, occurs in context where acquiescence seems largely beside the point. Instead, the 
turn to practice rests on more amorphous notions that past usage has its own legitimacy, if 
not authority, based on its very past-ness. Much reliance on historical practice in this area, 
I suggest, invokes a form of prescription.  
Edmund Burke famously said that “[p]rescription is the most solid of all titles, not 
only to property, but . . . to government. . . . It is a presumption in favour of any settled 
scheme of government against any untried project, that a nation has long existed and 
flourished under it.”21 Burke went so far as to insist that the authority of traditional practice 
“is a far better presumption even of the choice of a nation, far better than any sudden and 
temporary arrangement by actual election.”22 Customary practice and prescriptive wisdom 
have long played an important role in American constitutionalism, but they remain 
underappreciated in constitutional theory. Reliance on tradition has been criticized from 
multiple directions as either too easy to manipulate23 (and therefore a cover for judicial 
activism) or too confining24 (and therefore likely to lock in an unjust status quo). And from 
a more positivist standpoint, reliance on historical practice in constitutional interpretation 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). 
19 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 165-68 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for conferring constitutional status on state sovereign immunity that forecloses 
alteration by statute). 
20 See, e.g, Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2091; NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2571-72 (2014); see also 
Roisman, supra note 3; Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 44 (“Under most accounts of historical gloss, there 
must be some acquiescence in the practice by the other political branch of government in order for the practice 
to be credited.”). 
21 Edmund Burke, Speech on the Reform of Representation in the House of Commons (1787), in 2 THE WORKS 
OF THE RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE, at 486, 487 (Henry G. Bohn ed., 1841). 
22 Id. 
23 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 
1615 (1990). 
24 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699, 1708 
(1991). 
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arguably permits changes in constitutional meaning that circumvent both Article V’s 
amendment process and more general limits on judicial lawmaking.25  
Distinguishing between the constitutive and entrenchment aspects of 
constitutionalism helps to address these criticisms. Much past practice in the federal courts 
field derives its authority from longstanding usage, largely independent of legitimation 
through some form of acquiescence. But because little of that practice is entrenched against 
legal change, it simply does not raise the same concerns about “constitutional adverse 
possession” that arise when historical practice is used to “gloss” the meaning of 
constitutional text. The weight of the “dead hand of the past”26 is less oppressive when past 
practices are subject to legislative override.  
Conversely, the incremental and evolutionary reform that prescription also entails 
is easier to defend when it does not involve change in the meaning of entrenched 
constitutional principles and structures. I do not deny that courts make law when, for 
example, they import common law or equitable principles to define the scope of federal 
jurisdiction or recognize and limit remedies against government actors. This sort of judicial 
lawmaking—the subject of an extensive literature on federal common law—raises 
legitimacy problems of its own.27 But the Courts do not circumvent Article V so long as 
they do not seek to confer any sort of entrenched status on these norms. And the more 
general critique of judicial lawmaking is surely less compelling when such lawmaking 
conforms to roles that our courts have exercised since the beginning of the Republic. There 
is a certain circularity, of course, in saying that tradition legitimizes the courts’ reliance on 
tradition. But prescriptive authority necessarily embraces that sort of circularity.28   
By surveying the uses of historical practice, I hope to make three broader 
contribution to the literature in constitutional theory. As Richard Fallon has noted, all 
participants in debates about constitutional interpretation seem agree that history is relevant 
to that enterprise; it turns out, however, that history is used in multifarious ways and not 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2617 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that by 
relying on ambiguous historical practice rather than the constitutional text, “[t]he majority replaces the 
Constitution's text with a new set of judge-made rules to govern recess appointments”). 
26 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1127 (1998) (discussing the “dead hand problem” in constitutional law).  
27 See generally Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639 
(2008); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986); 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–12 (1985).  
28 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1753, 1808 (2015) (observing that “any practice-based theory of law contains an irreducible 
element of circularity: what is accepted as law determines what the law is, either directly in cases of consensus 
or partly when otherwise disputable questions must be resolved based on a mix of fit with past practice and 
normative attractiveness”).  
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simply to establish the original understanding of constitutional text.29 The first 
contribution, then, is simply to expand our understanding of how past practices figure in 
debates about constitutional law. 
The second contribution bears on the literature of constitutional change. That 
literature is driven by a single compelling observation—that is, that the structure of 
contemporary American governance and the array of rights that individuals possess are 
hare to square with the original understanding of the Constitution’s text, including the 
textual amendments.30 The most prominent theories of constitutional change outside 
Article V—such as Bruce Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional moments”31—have 
dazzled more than they have persuaded.32 If some form of “living constitutionalism” is a 
fact of modern life, we need a much more specific (and plausible) account of its 
mechanisms and some notion how those mechanisms are disciplined and constrained. I 
submit that historical practice plays a leading role in this story. 
Finally, this essay draws on a philosophical tradition that is often neglected in 
constitutional debates. Those debates are dominated, on the Right, by a majoritarian and 
ultimately rationalistic vision that employs originalism as a constraint on the counter-
majoritarian power of judges.33 The Left, on the other hand, embraces a vision of living 
constitutionalism as a means of either furthering progressive moral values34 or carving out 
a wider sphere for technocratic pragmatism.35 This essay builds instead on an older 
tradition of classical conservative thought built around a Burkean commitment to 
prescriptive knowledge and organic, incremental change. Part of my objective here is to 
elaborate what a Burkean constitutional theory might look like.36 
                                                 
29 See id. at 1754-55. 
30 See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 455. 
31 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of 
the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994); Akhil Reed 
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988). 
32 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (unpersuaded). 
33 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989); Robert H. Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1 (1971). 
34 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & CHRISTOPHER 
H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION (2010); Rebecca L. Brown, Assisted Living for the 
Constitution, 59 Drake L. Rev. 985, 999 (2011);  Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV.7 (1969). 
35 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006); 
CASS R, SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1993). 
36 A limited constitutional literature on Burke has developed in recent years, but it has been written primarily 
by scholars who self-identify as progressives. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. 
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 Part I of this essay lays some theoretical groundwork. I try to be more specific about 
what we mean by reliance on historical practice, discuss the distinct constitutive and 
entrenchment functions of constitutions, and introduce Burke’s theory of prescription.  Part 
II assesses several specific areas in which federal courts law relies upon historical practice: 
the doctrine of precedent; incorporation into federal doctrine of preexisting bodies of law, 
such as the English common law or equity practice; and the canons of statutory 
construction. None of these areas invokes practice as a historical “gloss” on the 
Constitution’s text in the manner of Noel Canning and similar separation of powers cases, 
and each tends to derive the legitimacy of practice from long duration rather than from 
notions of inter-branch acquiescence. 
Part III draws some general conclusions. I argue that using historical practice as a 
gloss on constitutional text to resolve contested questions of separation of powers is neither 
the most common nor the most important way in which such practice contributes to our 
law. Entrenching such practice against legal change, I argue, tends to be counterproductive. 
Moreover, reliance on practice is best justified on prescriptive grounds. The primary 
alternative—practice as acquiescence—is both descriptively implausible and normatively 
unappealing. In the end, I hope to show that attendance to the uses of practice in the 
somewhat more prosaic setting of federal jurisdiction can both allay certain fears about 
reliance on practice and contribute to important current debates about constitutional 
interpretation. 
I. Historical Practice and Constitutional Functions 
 The appropriate role of history has long been a staple of debates about constitutional 
meaning. Attention has focused, however, on the use of historical materials to ascertain the 
intent of the constitutional Framers and the original understanding of terms appearing in 
the constitutional text.37 Philip Bobbitt’s well-known modalities of constitutional 
argument, for example, defined the “historical” modality as focused on “the intentions of 
the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution”; none of his six modalities afforded a place to 
past practices that did not go to original intent.38 But as Richard Fallon recently observed, 
“increasingly tired, stylized debates” about originalism in constitutional interpretation 
obscure the wide variety of ways in which history may influence the determination of 
                                                 
L. REV. 353 (2006). That literature is useful and interesting, but for obvious reasons its embrace of Burke is 
partial and limited. 
37 Compare, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three 
Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226 (1988) (defending focus on the Framers’ intent), with Paul 
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204 (1980) (just like it 
sounds).  
38 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991).  
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constitutional meaning.39 Post-founding practice, for example, may provide insights into 
the original understanding of constitutional terms, resolve disputes about that meaning that 
existed at the Founding, or suggest organic growth of constitutional meaning over time.40 
 Historical practice has particular significance in federal courts law. The 
constitutional text says little about the judicial power, and both the convention and 
ratification debates focused largely on other topics.41 As a result, the structure of the federal 
judicial system, its modes of proceeding, and its relation both to the other national branches 
of government and to the state governments have been fleshed out through a wide variety 
of subconstitutional practices. These include a succession of judiciary statutes enacted by 
Congress, rules of procedure promulgated by the courts in the exercise of delegated 
authority, a robust array of common law and equitable doctrines, and a plethora of less 
formal norms and ways of proceeding that have grown up over time. These enactments and 
practices have legal force in their own right, but they also inform our understanding of “the 
judicial power” in Article III. 
Notwithstanding the pervasive impact of historical practice on the law of federal 
jurisdiction, the phenomenon remains understudied in this field. Much of the recent 
literature on historical practice as a modality of constitutional interpretation focuses on 
separation of powers.42 With certain important exceptions,43 historical writing about 
federal jurisdiction has been in the originalist vein.44 This may be more the case today than 
in the golden age of Legal Process scholarship that once dominated and defined the field 
of federal jurisdiction. That scholarship was often functionalist in its orientation, and when 
it turned to history it frequently looked to practice across the broad sweep of our national 
                                                 
39 Fallon, History, supra note 28, at 1753. 
40 On history’s relation to the organic growth of constitutional meaning, see, e.g., Ernest A. Young, 
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 
619, 688-712 (1994). 
41 See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1 (7th ed. 2015) [hereinafter HART 
& WECHSLER]. 
42 See, e.g., sources cited in note 3, supra. 
43 A recent panel of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Federal Courts addressed “The 
Role of History in the Federal Courts Canon.” See Amanda L. Tyler, Assessing the Role of History in the 
Federal Courts Canon: A Word of Caution, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739 (2015); Fallon, History, supra 
note 28; Tara Leigh Grove, Article III in the Political Branches, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1835 (2015). 
44 See, e.g., Tyler, History, supra note 43, at 1739 (observing that “in the federal courts arena—more so than 
in the broader domain of constitutional law—originalism has always wielded tremendous influence over 
much of the judicial and scholarly thinking”).  
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experience, not simply to the Founding era.45 Nonetheless, the broader current of 
contemporary constitutional theory may have something to add to the way that federal 
courts scholarship has thought about historical practice. And the Federal Courts literature 
may have something useful to say to the broader current of constitutional theory. 
A. What Do We Mean by “Practice,” and How Do Courts Rely on It? 
It will help to begin by defining somewhat more precisely what we mean by 
historical practice. “Practice” is, of course, a very broad term; the Oxford English 
Dictionary defines it, for instance, as simply “[a]n action” or “a deed” and contrasts it with 
“theory.”46 This definition is broad enough to include virtually any binding legal materials, 
such as a statute or a constitutional provision. To speak of historical practice as a distinct 
source of legal meaning, however, we need to distinguish it from past governmental actions 
that bind courts and other decisionmakers of their own force. For purposes of this 
discussion, I take a “practice” to be any past action of a public or private actor that is 
invoked to resolve a present legal dispute even though it has no direct binding effect on 
that dispute.    
 Common definitions of “practice” often incorporate the additional element of 
repetition and regularity; the OED speaks of “[t]he habitual doing or carrying on of 
something,” “usual, customary, or constant action or performance,” or “[a] habitual action 
or pattern of behavior.”47  Hence, Justice Frankfurter emphasized the authority of a 
“systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued”48; likewise, Noel Canning and 
Zivotofsky looked to past congressional and executive actions for a pattern of behavior, not 
simply a single authoritative instance.49 I have little doubt that the influence of a practice 
will be at least partly a function of the degree and consistency of its repetition. At this 
definitional stage, however, I do not want to rule out the possibility that a single act might 
not have authoritative influence in certain situations.50 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 
(1954); Herbert L. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the Federal Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 578 (1954). 
46 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006), available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/149226?rskey=ksMl1h&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid (definition 2b); 
see also id. (definition 2a: “The actual application or use of an idea, belief, or method, as opposed to the 
theory or principles of it . . . .”).   
47 Id. (definitions 3a & 3b); see also id. (definition 3c: “Law. An established legal procedure, esp. that of a 
court of law; the law and custom on which such procedure is based.”). 
48 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
49 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091-94 (2015); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 
2561-64 (2014). 
50 For example, George Washington’s decision not to run for a third term is a classic example of an historical 
practice that shaped public understandings of the Presidency. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Understanding 
Informal Constitutional Change, Tulane University School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Working 
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 What practice counts, temporally speaking? As one “present at the creation” of our 
government, at a time when American government had no truly “longstanding” practice of 
its own, James Madison understandably emphasized the force of precedents set by early 
politicians and courts in elucidating constitutional meaning.51 But whether or not that very 
early practice has unique or even exclusive force in other areas of constitutional law,52 the 
law of federal courts has frequently relied on both historical practice that long predates the 
Constitution (e.g., the traditions of English practice at common law and in equity and 
admiralty53) and that developed considerably after ratification (e.g., conventions about the 
role of the U.S. Supreme Court vis-à-vis state courts54). In these scenarios, the force of 
practice comes not so much from the status of politicians and judges closely associated 
with the Founding itself, but rather from the weight of longstanding usage over time.   
 Courts have relied on practice and usage in a variety of ways. Justice Frankfurter 
wrote in Youngstown that “[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government 
cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text 
or supply them.”55 This statement, occurring just before Frankfurter’s oft-quoted mention 
of “gloss,”56 neatly articulates the two ways in which historical practice generally enters 
into constitutional analysis: practice helps us interpret the meaning of provisions in the 
constitutional text; and practice also supplements that canonical text, filling in its many 
gaps and thus becoming part of our “constitution outside the Constitution.”  
                                                 
Paper No. 16-1, at  13 (Jan. 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2724580 (discussing the significance 
of this example). That decision derived considerable force from subsequent presidents’ repeated to conform 
their practice to Washington (at least until FDR). But much of its force surely derived from the prestige and 
personal authority of Washington himself. See, e.g., RICHARD BROOKHISER, FOUNDING FATHER: 
REDISCOVERING GEORGE WASHINGTON 185-90 (1996) (discussing the power of Washington’s example). 
51 See The Federalist No. 37, at 241, 245 (Isaac Kramnick, ed., 1987) (1788); see also, e.g., STANLEY ELKINS 
& ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 55-56 
(1993) (discussing how very early interactions between President Washington and the Senate demonstrated 
the unworkability of the Senate “advising” the President before he took action on a matter, establishing a 
precedent emphasizing ex post “consent”).  
52 See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 29-41 (canvassing and rejecting arguments for exclusive reliance 
on early practice in the broader separation of powers context); see also William Baude, Liquidation and 
Federal Judicial Power, unpublished manuscript (Oct. 2015) (arguing that Madison gave primacy to later 
practice). 
53 See Section II.B, infra. 
54 See, e.g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (construing amendments to the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdictional statute not to disrupt the longstanding relationship between the Court and the state 
courts). 
55 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
56 See id. (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words 
of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.”). 
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Much discussion of relying on historical practice in constitutional law has focused 
on the first category. Acknowledging that the Founding had failed to resolve all ambiguities 
in the constitutional document, James Madison said in Federalist 37 that indeterminacy is 
inevitable in “the institutions of man, in which the obscurity arises as well from the object 
itself as from the organ by which it is contemplated.”57 Hence, “[a]ll new laws, though 
penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature 
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be 
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”58 And 
as Madison’s subsequent conduct and statements made clear, he thought those subsequent 
“discussions and adjudications” might well occur outside the courts as well as within 
them.59 In this vein, the Noel Canning majority turned to historical interactions between 
the President and Congress to establish the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause.60  
On the other hand, much reliance on past practice in the law of federal courts, which 
I discuss in Part II, seems supplemental in nature. Article III does not specify the scope of 
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction; in Murdock v. Memphis,61 however, the Court 
imposed a strong presumption, derived from longstanding practice, that the Court may not 
review state courts’ resolution of questions of state law. Likewise, the Court has made clear 
that its broad conception of state sovereign immunity is not a “gloss” on either Article III 
or the Eleventh Amendment, but rather an artifact of preexisting practice under the English 
common law.62  
Not surprisingly, however, the line between these two modes is not completely 
clean even in theory, much less in practice. One might describe phenomena such as the 
doctrine of precedent or adoption of preexisting bodies of law as a gloss on the meaning of 
the “judicial power” language in Article III without making any mistake of principle. The 
key consideration, to my mind, lies in the amount of work that the relevant textual provision 
                                                 
57 The Federalist No. 37, at 241, 244 (Isaac Kramnick, ed., 1987) (1788) (James Madison); see also id. at 245 
(“When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous 
as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.”). 
58 Id. at 245. 
59 See, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 514 (1789) (Madison arguing to his colleagues in the First Congress that their 
practice regarding presidential removal of executive branch officers “will become the permanent exposition 
of the Constitution” on that point); see also Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 34 (emphasizing that “Madison 
referred both to practice and to judicial decisions as involved in liquidation”). 
60 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561-64, 2570-73 (2014). 
61 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). 
62 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 
(1996); see also Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (“Manifestly, we cannot 
rest with a mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh 
Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the 
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.”). 
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does in the analysis. In Noel Canning, for example, the text of the Recess Appointments 
Clause sharply defined and limited the relevant set of practices, and those practices in turn 
plainly reflected an effort by the respective political actors to interpret the Clause.63 Hence, 
I would treat Noel Canning as a clear case of historical gloss.64 
At the other end of the spectrum, consider the federal courts importing the 
longstanding equitable prohibition on enjoining a criminal prosecution to ground the 
doctrine of Younger abstention.65 One might say that Younger is a gloss on the “judicial 
power” as it relates to the powers of federal judges vis-à-vis state courts, but the text of 
Article III does precious little work in the analysis of historical practice. It seems much 
more helpful to say simply that Article III leaves the relations of state and federal courts 
unspecified in a variety of important ways, and that Younger abstention supplements the 
canonical text by helping to constitute that relationship.  
The Zivotofsky case poses an intermediate—and therefore more difficult—case. 
The only constitutional text in sight is Article II, which empowers the President to “receive 
ambassadors and other public ministers.”66 The Court read Founding-era practice as a gloss 
on that language, concluding “that a Clause directing the President alone to receive 
ambassadors would be understood to acknowledge his power to recognize other nations.”67 
The Court relied on further evidence of practice—this time in international law—to 
conclude that this recognition power “may also involve the determination of a state’s 
territorial bounds.”68 Finally, the Court canvassed extensive evidence of practices by 
presidents and the Congress concerning whether the recognition power is exclusive to the 
Executive.69 Whether or not the Court correctly evaluated all this evidence of practice 
concerning recognition, it seems a considerable stretch to say that Article II’s text—which 
does not use the term and covers only receiving ambassadors—is doing much work. Better, 
                                                 
63 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567-68 (2014). 
64 Some commentators have seen an important difference between the use of practices stretching over the 
course of our history to interpret ambiguous constitutional text (“gloss”) and a focus on immediate post-
ratification practice to fix the meaning of ambiguous terms (“liquidation”). The important point for my 
purposes, however, is simply that both liquidation and gloss employ practice as an interpretive tool for 
discerning the meaning of ambiguous constitutional text. 
65 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (relying on English equity practice for rule barring 
federal court interference with pending state court criminal proceedings). 
66 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
67 135 S. Ct. at 2085. 
68 Id. at 2084 (citing an international law treatise). 
69 See id. at 2091-94. 
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I think, to say that the Court is filling in the gaps in the President’s power—that is, 
supplementing the canonical text—by looking to past usage.70  
A final critical issue involves the status of practice-based norms vis-à-vis legal 
efforts to alter or override them. In Zivotofsky, the Court held that Congress could not 
override the Executive’s decision concerning territorial recognition;71 hence, the Court not 
only gave legal force to the past practice of Executive recognition but also entrenched that 
practice against change through ordinary lawmaking. I explore the importance of this move 
in the next section. 
B. The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions 
 This essay is about the use of historical practice in constitutional cases, but I am 
employing a broader-than-usual view of what falls in that category. Contemporary 
constitutional theory seeks to unpack the various functions of constitutions.72 As I have 
developed elsewhere, constitutions typically do at least three things: they constitute the 
government by creating institutions, defining those institutions’ powers and conferring 
jurisdiction upon them, and articulating rules for their operation; they frequently confer 
rights on individuals vis-à-vis the government (which is really just the flip-side of the 
constitutive function); and many (but certainly not all) constitutions entrench the 
institutions and rights they create against easy change in the future.73 Our Constitution, 
unlike the British, seeks to encapsulate each of these functions in a single, canonical 
document. Writing in Federalist 37, however, James Madison candidly acknowledged the 
complexity of defining the powers and limits of governmental institutions as well the 
difficulty of reducing the requisite concepts to writing.74   
                                                 
70 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 14-15 (2d ed. 1996) 
(identifying executive foreign affairs powers that are “missing” from the constitutional text but that have 
been filled in by practice).  
71 135 S. Ct. at 2094-95. 
72 See, e.g., ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 3-6 (2003); Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of 
Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 153-54 
(Larry Alexander, ed., 1998); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 227 (identifying “constitutional 
essentials”). 
73 See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 415-16; Raz, supra note 72, at 153-54. The British 
Constitution, for example, is generally not entrenched because the King in Parliament retains authority to 
make or unmake any law. See TOMKINS, supra note 72, at 16-17. 
74 See Federalist No. 37, supra note 51, at 243-45; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) 
(Holmes, J.) (“[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the 
United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not 
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.”). 
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Hence, as John Marshall wrote in McCulloch, the Constitution’s nature “requires 
that only its great outlines should be marked [and] its important objects designated.”75 This 
necessary incompleteness means that the Constitution can have no monopoly of the first of 
its functions; it cannot, in other words, constitute a complete government on its own. 
Hence, Article I describes Congress in greater detail than the other two branches, yet it 
leaves out critical details such as structures for deliberation, voting rules, or qualifications 
to vote in congressional elections.76 These details have all been filled in through 
subconstitutional practices—some statutory, some internal House and Senate rules, and 
some unwritten conventions of behavior.77 Article III, which describes the judiciary in far 
less detail, punted most of the crucial questions—such as whether to create lower federal 
courts at all—to the First Congress and continues to require considerable gap-filling.78 
I have called the various forms of “ordinary law”—statutes, regulations, 
conventional practices—that perform these constitutive functions our “Constitution 
Outside the Constitution.”79  But that does not mean that these rules and institutions share 
the entrenched status of the Constitution’s canonical text. To be sure, some of the historical 
practices that have fleshed out the meaning of the Article III judicial power have hardened 
into rules that Congress may not override. It seems safe to say, for example, that Congress 
could not now enact a statute empowering the Supreme Court to issue advisory opinions.80  
My point is simply that whether a given practice should be viewed as constitutive of our 
governmental institutions is a separate question from whether that practice is also 
entrenched against change through ordinary legal means.81 In general, I would venture that 
                                                 
75 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
76 See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 418-20. 
77 See generally Llewellyn, supra note 15 (discussing the nation’s “working constitution”). As Stephen 
Griffin has pointed out, Professor Llewellyn took practice to have more than a gap-filling role; the practice 
is the Constitution, even where it may be inconsistent with textual rules. See Griffin, supra note 50, at 12.  
78 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 41, at 4-47; JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, 
AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 24-31 (2012). 
79 See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 473. 
80 See Fallon, History, supra note 28, at 1817 (“At an early point in our history, The Correspondence of the 
Justices and the acceptance of its rationale by the Supreme Court, presidents, and the American public placed 
advisory opinions in the category of the constitutionally forbidden.”). 
81 See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 454-55.  Other theories of a “functional” or “small 
c” constitution typically do assert that these additional rules and institutions are entrenched to some degree. 
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN 
COSNTITUTION (2013); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 (1991); Llewellyn, supra note 
15, at 26, 29; This creates a lot of pressure to define what is in and what is out—a burden that, in my view, 
these other theories have largely failed to carry. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 14, at 448-
54. 
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most governmental practices are constitutive to at least some degree, but very few are 
constitutionally entrenched. 
One of the principal sources of discomfort about the use of historical practice in 
constitutional law stems from the fear that past practices will either alter entrenched 
constitutional norms or come to be entrenched against change in their own right. Dissenting 
in the recent Noel Canning decision, for example, Justice Scalia worried that relying on 
historical practice allows the Executive to “accumulate power through adverse 
possession,” in violation of entrenched constitutional norms.82 But to say that American 
law sometimes “constitutionalizes” historical practice is all too often to conflate the 
different things that constitutions do.  Many instances of reliance on historical practice—
especially in the law of federal jurisdiction—treat that practice as constitutive without 
entrenching it against legal change;83 other instances entrench past practice only partially, 
without putting them on the same plane as the Constitution itself.84 Distinguishing between 
the different roles practice plays will help in assessing the normative attractiveness of 
appeals to practice in this area. 
C. Acquiescence and Prescription 
 Edmund Burke referred to reliance on longstanding practice in government as 
“prescription”—a word we do not use so much nowadays but which helpfully adds the 
notion of legal force to more general terms like “custom” or “historical practice.”85 
Prescription embodies “a choice not of one day, or one set of people” but rather “a 
deliberate election of ages and generations”; “it is a constitution made by . . . the peculiar 
circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and moral, civil and social habitudes of 
the people, which disclose themselves only in a long space of time.”86 Against 
Enlightenment rationalists who set out to question “unthinking” adherence to tradition, 
Burke insisted that prescription involved a higher form of rationality. “[M]an is a most 
unwise, and a most wise, being,” he argued.87 “The individual is foolish. The multitude, 
                                                 
82 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2617 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
83 See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 732 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that 
the abstention doctrines, which are grounded in equity practice, are subject to Congress’s legislative power). 
84 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding Congress’s power to restrict federal court 
jurisdiction subject to a strong clear statement rule, but not constitutionally prohibited altogether). 
85 See, e.g., Oxford English Dictionary, prescription, at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/150650?rskey=Sqa4CN&result=1#eid (3d ed. 2007) (defining 
“prescription” as “ancient or continued custom, esp. when regarded as authoritative” and a “[c]laim founded 
upon long use”). 
86 Burke, Representation, supra note 21, at 387. 
87 Id. 
 16 
for the moment, is foolish, when they act without deliberation; but the species is wise, and 
when time is given to it, as a species, it almost always acts right.”88  
As J.G.A. Pocock has demonstrated, Burke’s theory of prescription was rooted in 
the classic English doctrine of the ancient constitution that undergirded the development 
of the English common law.89 William Blackstone’s Commentaries begin their discussion 
of the common law with an account of longstanding custom.90 For Anthony Kronman, this 
sort of reasoning from prescriptive authority makes law inherently different from 
philosophy: “[T]he past is, for lawyers and judges, a repository of not just of information 
but of value, with the power to confer legitimacy on actions in the present, and though its 
power to do so is not limitless, neither is it nonexistent. In philosophy, by contrast, the past 
has no legitimating power of this sort.”91 In a profound meditation on Burke, Professor 
Kronman argues that the past’s authority is distinct from any utilitarian or fairness-based 
argument for precedent—that it is, at bottom, essential to what “makes us who we are” as 
human beings.92 These sorts of arguments seem to get short shrift in contemporary 
discourse.93 One suspects that non-specialists rarely study Burke nowadays. 
But in any event one need not go this far to accept the force of prescriptive 
reasoning. More practical rationales, resting on the need to treat some things as settled in 
order to address present problems in a manageable way, accord authority to past practice 
simply because it its longstanding and settled.94 Likewise, concerns about the disruptive 
effect of radical change tend to support an incremental approach to constitutional 
development that takes much of past practice as given at any particular stage.95 
                                                 
88 Id. 
89 J.G.A. Pocock, Burke and the Ancient Constitution—a Problem in the History of Ideas, in POLITICS, 
LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 202, 227 (1971). 
90 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *67-68 (1765); see also id. at *64 (observing 
that the ‘unwritten’ laws of England “receive their binding power, and the force of laws, by long and 
immemorial usage, and by their universal reception throughout the kingdom”). 
91 Anthony Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L. J. 1029, 1032-33 (1990). 
92 See id. at 1065-66. For a different argument that the past has authority simply because it is the past, see 
Raz, supra note 72, at 173 (arguing that “[c]onstitutions, at least old ones, do not derive their authority from 
the authority of their authors,” but rather “are valid just because they are there, enshrined in the practices of 
their countries”). 
93 See, e.g., Roisman, supra note 3, at 33 (stating, with little elaboration, that past practice cannot have 
authoritative force without some further normative reason behind it). 
94 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 7 
(2004); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 599 (1987). 
95 See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 411-12 (expanded ed. 1991); 
Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 40, at 654-56 (discussing Burke’s preference for 
incremental change). 
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 Burke’s notion that practice derives its authority from longstanding usage—that the 
past has authority simply because it is the past—runs counter to much contemporary 
discussion of historical practice as an aid to constitutional interpretation. That literature 
tends to ground the force of practice in the acquiescence of critical actors.96 Likewise, 
Supreme Court opinions resolving high-profile separation of powers disputes among the 
branches of the national government tend to emphasize one branch’s acquiescence (or lack 
thereof) to the exercise of power by a rival branch.97 To be sure, one may understand any 
longstanding usage as resting on a form of acquiescence; if the relevant political or legal 
actors had not accepted the practice over time, they would have changed it. Blackstone, for 
example, required that a custom “must have been peaceable, and acquiesced in; not subject 
to contention and dispute”; this was because “customs owe their origins to common 
consent.” 98 But the sort of acquiescence entailed by prescriptive authority tends to take 
place over a more extended period of time, and to involve a more diffuse set of actors, than 
that involved in high-profile separation of powers disputes. Moreover, the authority of 
longstanding practice tends not to depend on any sort of explicit airing of the relevant issue, 
to which the affected party might have been expected to object. 
Interesting debates exist about the relationship between custom and the common 
law, about Blackstone’s particular theories of general and local custom, and the extent to 
which those theories were found persuasive in America.99 But the basic point is simply that 
longstanding usage was integral to the English common law,100 and this notion of 
prescriptive authority would have been part of the Founders’ basic intellectual equipment. 
Some influential figures in the early Republic, such as Thomas Jefferson, labored mightily 
to reject English traditionalism, and that way of thinking scored important victories in 
                                                 
96 See, e.g., Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 44 (“Under most accounts of historical gloss, there must be 
some acquiescence in the practice by the other political branch of government in order for the practice to be 
credited.”); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 3, at 414 (“The most common reason [for giving authority to 
historical practice] appears to be the idea that the cited practice involves the ‘acquiescence’ of one branch in 
the actions of the other.”); see also Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers 
Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 134 (1984) (arguing that for a historical practice to have force in construing 
the separation of powers, the other branch must have been on notice of the practice and “must have 
acquiesced” in it).  
97 See, e.g, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2571-72 (2014); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 684 (1981); see also Youngstown, 
343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasizing the force of presidential practice “long pursued 
to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned”). 
98 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 90, at *77 (emphasis in original). There are, however, important differences 
between the sort of acquiescence involved in many separation of powers disputes and “consent” as that term 
is generally understood. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 3, at 44 n.240 (“To the extent that historical gloss is 
premised only on the acquiescence of the affected branch, it is not thought to require an actual agreement or 
bargain between the branches.”). 
99 See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 27-41 (2010). 
100 See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 30-31 (1967). 
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preventing any blanket reception of the common law into the federal Constitution and 
rejecting federal prosecutions for federal common law crimes.101 Nonetheless, the newly-
independent States’ universal reception of the English common law102 and the Framers’ 
direct incorporation of innumerable common law concepts into the Constitution itself103 
suggests that the undeniable innovation of a written, higher-law Constitution was grafted 
onto a broader legal system that derived significant authority from ancient usage.104 As my 
colleague Stephen Sachs has observed, “[n]ot even the American Revolution severed our 
links to the legal past: the change in government wasn’t thought to produce a wholesale 
change in law, especially private law.”105  
Moreover, because the new written constitution provided only a framework of 
government and was designed to be accessible to the People at large, it necessarily lacked 
the institutional detail necessary to form a working government.106 Post-ratification 
practice (defined broadly to include not simply informal actions but also sub-constitutional 
enactments and judicial decisions) has filled that gap. Many features of the early practice—
such as the rejection of impeachment as a remedy for perceived judicial errors,107 the 
prohibition on common law crimes,108 the bar on advisory opinions,109 the crucial 
distinction between remedies against the sovereign and remedies against the sovereign’s 
                                                 
101 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 132-42 (1996) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 224–225 (1911) (noting a “prejudice 
against the system of English Common Law” in the years following the Revolution). 
102 See, e.g., Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. 
REV. 791 (1951). 
103 See, e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9 (protecting the common law writ of habeas corpus); amdt. VII (protecting 
the common law right to a civil jury trial). 
104 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE 
ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975) (discussing the continuity of common law practice in the 
state courts before and after the Revolution); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part II, 133 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1231, 1234-41 (1985) (surveying the continuing importance of the English common law in the 
early Republic after independence). 
105 Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1822 (2012). 
106 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (observing that a constitution’s 
“nature . . . requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated”). 
107 See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 
422-25 (2009). 
108 See, e.g., Gary D. Rowe, Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the 
Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law crimes, 101 YALE L. J. 919 (1992). 
109 See Correspondence of the Justices (1793), collected in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 41, at 50-52 
(declining to render an advisory opinion on legal questions involving the interpretation of treaties with France 
and England submitted to the Court by Thomas Jefferson on behalf of the Washington administration). 
 19 
officers,110 and the requirement that judicial judgments be immune from non-judicial 
revision111—have endured for centuries. 
Prescription is a fundamentally pre-democratic rationale for legal norms. As I will 
show, however, it persists throughout American legal practice. The most obvious example 
is the reception by the post-revolutionary American states of the English common law. 
While the reception itself was generally accomplished by legislative adoption and therefore 
a matter of democratic choice, the reception statutes made no effort to review and 
distinguish among substantive common law norms. Rather, reception was a democratic 
decision to adopt the pre-revolutionary law simply because it had been the law for a very 
long time and its results were generally perceived to be satisfactory. Just as the English 
legal system had transitioned from monarchy to parliamentary democracy over time, while 
retaining the common law and any number of other pre-democratic survivals, the newly-
independent American colonists grafted a new commitment to constitutionalism onto pre-
constitutional English system that, in most respects, was thought to be working reasonably 
well. There was no Bastille to storm, and no French revolutionary-style effort to rethink 
the legal system from the ground up.112 
Both the nature of the prescriptive legal sources adopted in American law and the 
dynamics of their integration with majoritarian democracy and constitutionalism have 
important implications for the ways prescriptive practice can function in constitutional 
interpretation. As I hope to demonstrate in the remainder of this essay, prescriptive practice 
has always played an important and pervasive constitutive role. Reliance on past practice 
absolved the successful revolutionaries of any need to make the world anew; it allowed 
them to rely on pre-existing institutions and norms, holding most of the legal system 
constant and allowing them to focus on articulating the limited but important ways in which 
the new government would differ from the old.113 But the notion of entrenching past 
practice would have run counter to both the way those practices had always worked and 
the new commitments to majoritarianism and constitutionalism. The English common law 
                                                 
110 See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857 (1824) (articulating the “party of 
record” rule that a suit against the government’s officers will not be treated as against the sovereign for 
purposes of sovereign immunity); see also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (permitting a suit against 
military officers acting on behalf of the United States to proceed); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) 
(holding that state sovereign immunity does not bar a suit against a state officer for prospective relief). 
111 See Hayburn’s Case, 2 u.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). It is worth noting that Hayburn’s Case itself did not 
produce an opinion for the Court. It is, rather, an instance of practice consisting of the Court’s pre-judgment 
proceedings in the case as well as correspondence from the circuit courts regarding the matter. See also HART 
& WECHSLER, supra note 41, at 83-87. 
112 See Sachs, supra note 105, at 1821 (noting that after the American Revolution, “the Founders didn’t 
declare a legal Year Zero, nor did they repeal and replace all prior law,” in contrast to the French 
revolutionaries, who did generally abrogate all former laws and replace them with the Code Napoleon).  
113 See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 104; Sachs, supra note 105, at 1821-23; Hall, supra note 102, at 798-800. 
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had generally not been entrenched, but—like the rest of English law, including 
constitutional law—had remained subject to alteration by a sovereign Parliament.114 And 
the Philadelphia convention rejected proposals for a common law reception provision in 
the Constitution itself precisely because that might have rendered the common law 
immutable. 
I do not argue here that historical practices should never be treated as shaping or 
supplementing constitutional meaning in a way that cannot be modified through ordinary 
legislation. But we should be terribly cautious about doing that. It is, after all, a mode of 
constitutional interpretation with little support in historical practice. 
II. Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law 
 This Part explores a variety of elements of federal courts law that, in one way or 
another, involve reliance on historical practices. I begin with three sets of familiar 
phenomena: judicial reliance on past decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis; federal 
incorporation of preexisting bodies of law, such as the English common law; and use of 
the canons of construction in interpreting federal statutes.  These phenomena are so familiar 
that we generally do not think of them as part of the broader category of reliance on 
historical practice that figures in cases like Noel Canning or Zivotofsky.  
Federal courts law does rely on practice in ways more analogous to Noel Canning 
and Zivotofsky. The basic structure of federal jurisdiction, such as the scope of the Supreme 
Court’s review in cases arising under state law or in the state courts, have acquired a strong 
sociological entrenchment arising from longstanding practice.115 The availability and 
parameters of habeas corpus review are largely framed by practice.116 And the amenability 
of senior executive officials to federal judicial process has been established largely by the 
President’s decision to comply at key points in our history.117 Nonetheless, a key part of 
                                                 
114 See TOMKINS, supra note 72, at 16-17. 
115 See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 
923 (1986) (concluding that the rules of Erie and Murdock “are a well-established foundation of the system 
on which many of our suppositions concerning federalism have been built. Even if not constitutionally 
required in any strict sense, they appear to be permanent features of our system”). 
116 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739-52 (2008) (canvassing both English and early American 
practice on judicial review of executive detention, although concluding that the common that did not 
definitively answer the question before the Court); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473-75, 481-82 (2004) 
(relying on English and American practice in defining the territorial reach of the writ); Williams v. Kaiser, 
323 U.S. 471, 484 n.2 (1945) (observing that habeas corpus is “a writ antecedent to statute . . . throwing its 
root deep into the genius of our common law”). 
117 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); John P. MacKenzie, Court Orders Nixon to Yield 




my argument is that reliance on practice is pervasive and routine, and that reliance on past 
practice in these more prosaic settings can shed important light on the broader 
phenomenon. 
A. Judicial Precedent 
 We generally think of judicial precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis as their 
own modality of interpretation—not part of a broader reliance on historical practice.118 But 
generally speaking, the “practice” that courts engage in overwhelmingly involves the 
decision of cases. There are, to be sure, certain aspects of internal housekeeping, such as 
the assignment of panels and cases or the Supreme Court’s certiorari policies,119 as well 
as certain rulemaking functions of broader significance,120 where judges engage in 
“practices” outside the decision of cases.121 But the overwhelming majority of judicial 
practice consists of deciding cases. The influence that past decisions have in resolving 
present controversies is the most familiar example of judicial reliance on past practice—so 
familiar, in fact, that judges following precedent may be no more aware that they are 
invoking historical practice than Molière’s bourgeois gentleman was that he was speaking 
prose.122 
 Judicial precedent fits my definition of practice in two distinct respects. First, a 
prior decision is itself a past act by another actor that lacks direct binding authority on a 
current dispute. A judicial decision’s direct binding force is generally limited to the parties; 
this force is captured by the doctrine of res judicata, not stare decisis.123 The influence of 
the past court’s decision is also conceptually distinct from the binding force of the 
underlying positive law—typically, a statute or constitutional provision—that the prior 
                                                 
118 See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 38, at 13 (identifying the “doctrinal” modality of “applying rules generated 
by precedent”). 
119 See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2015) (discussing panel assignment); Sup. Ct. Rule 10, 
available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/supct/rule_10 (visited Oct. 2, 2015) (articulating criteria for 
granting certiorari); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (1994) (explicating the considerably more complex patterns of practice underlying Rule 
10). 
120 See Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (June 19, 1934), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(delegating to the Supreme Court the authority to promulgate rules of procedure).  
121 Other examples would include the Chief Justice’s administrative powers over the judicial branch, see, 
e.g.., Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 341 
(2004), and the dramatic authority of the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to control the litigation of mass 
torts and other sorts of aggregate litigation, see, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict 
Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71 (2015). 
122 MOLIERE, THE BOURGEOIS GENTLEMAN, Act II, scene 4 (1670). 
123 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Supranational Rulings as Judgments and Precedents, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 477 (2008) (distinguishing between the judgment and precedential force of judicial rulings). 
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decision applied. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s recent patent law decision 
in Bilski v. Kappos.124 Section 101 of the Patent Act broadly states that “[w]hoever invents 
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”125 Nonetheless, 
“[t]he Court’s precedents provide three specific exceptions” for “‘laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”126 Acknowledging that “these exceptions are not required 
by the statutory text,” the Court observed that “they are consistent with the notion that a 
patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’”127 “And in any case,” the Court said, “these 
exceptions have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going 
back 150 years.”128 Bilski is thus a particularly self-conscious example of a course of 
decisions, taking place over an extended period of time, that supplements the meaning of 
the original textual provision that those decisions interpret and apply. 
 In constitutional law, the originalist critique of stare decisis has long insisted that 
judicial precedents interpreting the Constitution are not the same—and consequently lack 
the same authority—as the authoritative document itself.129 For our purposes, the Supreme 
Court’s decision interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause in Noel Canning is not 
intrinsically different from the Congressional and Executive interpretations of the Clause 
that the justices debated in their opinions. Both involve interpretations of a constitutional 
provision by one or another branch of government at some time in the past. In the next 
dispute raising a recess appointments issue, the Noel Canning opinion will be one more 
past practice interpreting the clause that may bear on the present dispute.130 The relative 
authority of past judicial interpretations vis-à-vis executive or legislative interpretations 
turns on complex matters of separation of powers, the res judicata effect of prior judgments 
on the original parties, the remedies granted in the prior litigation, and the like.131 But if 
                                                 
124 561 U.S. 593 (2010).  
125 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
126 561 U.S. at 601 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
127 Id. at 601-02. 
128 Id. at 602 (citing Le Roy v. Taham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75 (1853)).  
129 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 
(1994).  
130 See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Is a Recess Appointment to the Court an Option?, SCOTUSBLOG, Feb. 14, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/is-a-recess-appointment-to-the-court-an-option/ (parsing the Noel 
Canning opinions to assess the possibility of a recess appointment following the death of Justice Antonin 
Scalia). 
131 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 387; Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional 
Interpreter, 48 REV. OF POLITICS 401 (1986). 
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judicial precedents are typically more binding than legislative or executive ones,132 it is not 
because adherence to judicial decisions is any less a matter of deferring to historical 
practice. 
Second, the rule of stare decisis—that is, the respect that judges accord to prior 
decisions—is itself a judicial practice. The Constitution does not itself explicitly articulate 
a rule of precedent, and the Supreme Court has said that stare decisis is simply “‘a principle 
of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.’”133 The various 
nuances of the doctrine of precedent—the factors involved in its application, for example, 
or the notion that precedent binds more strongly in statutory cases than in constitutional 
ones—are likewise simply rules of practice distilled from the Court’s long experience 
deciding cases.134 When courts follow the rule of stare decisis, they are adhering to the 
way they have done things in the past. 
 Notwithstanding the Court’s statements that stare decisis is a “principle of policy,” 
one often sees arguments that stare decisis is inherent in the meaning of the “judicial 
power” conferred on the federal courts in Article III.135 I have considerable sympathy for 
that view, but I want to remain agnostic about it here. The important point is that the Article 
III claim is itself a good example of constitutional argument grounded in historical practice. 
Judge Richard Arnold’s famous opinion in Anastasoff, for example, urged that “in the late 
eighteenth century, the doctrine of precedent was well-established in legal practice (despite 
the absence of a reporting system), regarded as an immemorial custom, and valued for its 
role in past struggles for liberty.”136 Judge Arnold’s view treats practice as a gloss on 
Article III’s “judicial power”; the Supreme Court’s more conventional invocation of stare 
decisis as a “rule of policy” accords that practice its own independent force. But whether 
                                                 
132 See generally Ernest A. Young, Constitutionalism Outside the Courts, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION (Mark Graber, Sanford Levinson, & Mark Tushnet eds. 2015) (discussing the reasons 
why judicial interpretations of the Constitution tend to have a unique settlement function). 
133 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)); cf. 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect 
of Roe and Casey? 109 YALE L. J. 1535 (2000) (arguing that stare decisis is subject to legislative abrogation). 
134 Cf. Sachs, supra note 105, at 1865 (discussing stare decisis as a backdrop). 
135 See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900-04 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 
(8th Cir. 2000) (striking down rule prohibiting citation to unpublished opinions); Erica S. Weisgerber, Note, 
Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO. L. J. 621 (2009); see also 
James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of 
Decisionmaking required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998). But see Hart v. Massanari, 
266 F.3d 1155, 1159-69 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.) (denying that stare decisis is baked into the “judicial 
power” language in Article III). 
136 223 F.3d at 903. Judge Kozinski’s effort to refute Judge Arnold’s argument questioned the notion that 
past practice should be constitutionalized, but primarily argued that Arnold had misconstrued the practices 
of early courts and lawyers. See Hart, 266 F.3d at 1163-69. 
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courts respect stare decisis as a gloss on Article III or simply because it is a longstanding 
way of proceeding, the authority of past cases rests on past practice.  
Like other forms of reliance on historical practice, the doctrine of precedent takes 
into account the actions of actors outside the courts. Precedential weight varies, for 
example, according to whether other actors may correct the courts’ errors. Hence, the Court 
has said that “‘[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have special force in the area 
of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, 
the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have 
done.’”137 One can also frame this point as one of acquiescence: If Congress has not 
overridden a court’s past construction of a statute, it may be read as agreeing with (or at 
least accepting) that construction.138 Further, the reliance inquiry built into the stare decisis 
doctrine assesses whether other actors—most often private individuals but also public 
actors such as state governments—will be adversely affected by overruling a prior 
decision.139 
The precedential value of a prior decision often seems more categorical than the 
sorts of non-judicial practices at issue in Noel Canning or Zivotofsky. But when courts call 
precedents into question, the similarities between stare decisis and other practice-based 
forms of argument come into focus. Consider, for example, the debate in District of 
Columbia v. Heller140 concerning the force of the Court’s prior decision in United States v. 
Miller,141 which had seemed to embrace an interpretation of the Second Amendment 
grounded in militia service. In urging the Court to follow Miller, Justice Stevens’s dissent 
emphasized that “hundreds of judges have relied on the view of the Amendment we 
endorsed there.”142 The majority instead stressed defects in the Miller Court’s decisional 
process, such as the defendant’s failure to appear and the Court’s own failure to discuss the 
                                                 
137 Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (quoting Patterson v. 
McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)). 
138 See, e.g., id. (“Congress has had almost 30 years in which it could have corrected our decision in Parden if 
it disagreed with it, and has not chosen to do so. We should accord weight to this continued acceptance of 
our earlier holding.”). There are, of course, any number of reasons not to infer too much from legislative 
inaction.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The ‘complicated check on legislation’ erected by our Constitution creates an inertia 
that makes it impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents (1) 
approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) 
unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political cowardice.”) (quoting 
The Federalist No. 62, at 378 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)). 
139 See, e.g., Hilton, 502 U.S. at 203. 
140 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
141 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
142 Heller, 554 U.S. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For similar emphasis on the concurrence of many judges, 
see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1987) (Scalia, J.). 
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history of the Second Amendment143—much as the Justices in Zivotofsky and Noel 
Canning debated the extent to which past legislative and executive practices reflected 
considered constitutional judgments or had been consistent over time. Although in 
principle a single decision may set a binding precedent, repetition, longevity, and 
consensus plainly matter.144 Indeed, some justices seem increasingly unwilling to accept a 
single decision, or even a course of a few decisions, as binding until they have been 
repeatedly reaffirmed over an extended period.145 It may well be that courts generally view 
stare decisis as more obligatory than reliance on other forms of historical practice, but these 
sorts of examples demonstrate that there is no difference in kind. 
 Finally, the reasons that we follow past judicial interpretations are basically the 
same as those for deferring to other forms of historical practice. They involve the same 
notions of intellectual humility and the need to avoid social disruption that Burke invoked 
in defense of prescription: 
An ignorant man, who is not fool enough to meddle with his clock, is, 
however, sufficiently confident to think he can safely take to pieces and put 
together, at his pleasure, a moral machine of another guise, importance, and 
complexity, composed of far other wheels and springs and balances and 
counteracting and cooperating powers. Men little think how immorally they 
act in rashly meddling with what they do not understand. Their delusive 
good intention is no sort of excuse for their presumption. They who truly 
mean well must be fearful of acting ill.146 
There is no a priori reason to think that judges today are smarter than the judges of 
yesteryear, and longstanding precedents that have been continually applied and reaffirmed 
                                                 
143 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 623-24 (majority opinion). 
144 See Strauss, Tradition, supra note 24, at 1706 (“It is one thing if a judicial precedent has been followed 
on many occasions, has become widely accepted by society, and has created a web of institutions dependent 
on it. . . . It is a different matter if a precedent is relatively recent and has not met widespread acceptance—
especially if the precedent itself overturned a widespread practice.”); see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 130 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (demonstrating at exhaustive length the error of the 
Court’s prior holding in Hans v. Louisiana, but declining to call for overruling the century-old precedent). 
145 See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97-98 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Despite my respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept [Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity] as controlling 
precedent.”); Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 699 (1999) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I am not yet ready to adhere to . . . Seminole Tribe.”); see also Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 837 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (continuing 
to reject strict scrutiny for “benign” racial classifications despite several prior holdings establishing that 
standard); see generally Allison Orr Larsen, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 447 (2008). 
146 Edmund Burke, An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (1791), in EDMUND BURKE: SELECTED 
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 623, 655-56 (Peter Stanlis, ed. 1963); see also Young, Rediscovering 
Conservatism, supra note , at 648-50 . 
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carry the endorsement of a much larger court than the present one.147 As Burke’s 
mechanical metaphor suggests, any given precedent may have become integrated into the 
legal mechanism such that the effects of overruling it may be hard to anticipate. And 
judicial precedent also performs a settlement function, allowing the work of the law to 
proceed without reinventing the wheel in every new case.148 As Charles Fried has put it, 
“[w]e want to avoid being like the man who cannot get to work in the morning because he 
must keep returning home to make quite sure he has turned off the gas.”149 But reliance on 
other forms of historical practice—at least where they are not contested—also performs 
this function. At least for purposes of the present discussion, it is hard to see any reason to 
distinguish in principle between reliance on settled judicial practices of interpretation 
(precedent) and reliance on other forms of historical practice. 
B. Incorporation of Extant Bodies of Law 
 A related form of reliance on primarily judicial practice occurs in the many different 
areas where the law of federal jurisdiction incorporates pre-existing (and generally very 
old) bodies of non-constitutional law. Sometimes this incorporation has been mandated by 
statute. In the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, for example, Congress required federal 
courts adjudicating suits at law to follow the forms of proceeding in the states in which 
they sat;150 this generally meant that they would follow the English common law, as 
received by the relevant American state.151 In equity and admiralty cases, the 1792 Act 
directed federal courts to employ the forms of proceeding used by English equity and 
admiralty courts.152 Likewise, the federal piracy statute incorporates the definition of piracy 
in “the law of nations.”153 
 In other areas, the federal courts have taken it upon themselves to adopt these pre-
existing bodies of law. Courts have grounded the sovereign immunity of government 
institutions—both federal and state—in the common law tradition inherited from 
                                                 
147 See Brest, supra note 37, at 228 (“[A] doctrine that survives over a period of time has the approval of a 
court composed, in effect, of all the judges who have ever had occasion to consider and apply it.”). 
148 See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (“[T]he labor of 
judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every 
case, and one could not lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others 
who had gone before him.”). 
149 FRIED, supra note 94, at 7. 
150 See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275 (repealed 1872); Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93 
(repealed 1792). 
151 See Anthony J. Bellia & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the Cause of Action in Federal Courts: 
The Example of the Alien Tort Statute, 101 Va. L. Rev. 609, 667-68 (2015). 
152 See id. at 614. 
153 18 U.S.C. § 1651. 
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England.154 The individual immunities of government officers have similar roots.155 The 
various abstention doctrines rest in substantial part on the discretionary practices of English 
common law and equity courts,156 and equity practice likewise provides remedies against 
unlawful state action.157 Although the admiralty provisions of both Article III and the 
various judiciary acts are purely jurisdictional in form and do not specify the body of law 
to be applied, federal courts have read those provisions to incorporate the general maritime 
law, or lex mercatoria, which is a form of customary international law.158  
                                                 
154 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (grounding state sovereign immunity in the common 
law rather than the text of the Eleventh Amendment); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 196, 205 
(1882) (observing that “the doctrine [of federal sovereign immunity] is derived from the laws and practices 
of our English ancestors”); The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 153 (1869) (grounding sovereign immunity in 
the “familiar doctrine of the common law”). The Court has often been at pains to insist that state sovereign 
immunity does not rest only on the common law. Sometimes the Court has pointed to still other bodies of 
preexisting law. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (pointing out that the 
Court’s decision expanding state immunities in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), “found its roots not 
solely in the common law of England, but in the much more fundamental ‘jurisprudence in all civilized 
nations’”) (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 17). And sometimes the Court has relied on more abstract notions of 
state sovereignty. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 733-34. But when the Court says that immunity from suit was “a 
fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, 
and which they retain today,” id. at 713, it is grounding that immunity in preexisting English common law 
background. See also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 32 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, for States as well as for the Federal Government,  was part of the understood background 
against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions did not mean to sweep 
away.”).  See also Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010) (“The doctrine of foreign sovereign 
immunity developed as a matter of common law long before the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was 
enacted in 1976.”) (emphasis added). 
155 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1992); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982); 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 494-99 (1896); see also Samantar, 
560 U.S. at 325 (holding that the individual immunities of foreign officers are governed by the common law). 
As Scheuer points out, however, official immunity “has been the product of constitutional provision as well 
as legislative and judicial processes.” 416 U.S. at 240. But even the legislative immunities, which derive in 
part from the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I, have been importantly shaped by past practice. See 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75 (1951) (grounding legislative immunities in English 
parliamentary practice). 
156 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-
01 (1941); see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996) (“Our longstanding 
application of these [abstention] doctrine reflects the common-law background against which the statutes 
conferring jurisdiction were enacted” and emphasizing the equitable roots of those doctrines). 
157 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015) (“The ability to sue 
to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, and reflects 
a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England.”). 
158 See, e.g., Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996) (“With admiralty jurisdiction . . . 
comes the application of substantive admiralty law.”); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924); 
see also Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 281-82 (1999); William Tetley, 
The General Maritime Law—the Lex Maritima (with a Brief Reference to the Ius Commune in Arbitration 
Law and the Conflict of Laws), 20 SYR. J. INT’L L. & COM. 105, 108 (1994) (“The general maritime law is a 
ius commune, is part of the lex mercatoria and is composed of the maritime customs, codes, conventions and 
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The history of the “general common law” provides a particularly striking example 
of judicial incorporation of preexisting law. Cases like Swift v. Tyson159 read the Rules of 
Decision Act160 to permit federal courts sitting in diversity to apply the general commercial 
law—another subclass of customary international law that was, as Justice Story explained, 
“not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world.”161 In the latter case, 
the law incorporated practice in a double sense: Swift adopted the practices of prior courts 
(including state and foreign courts) in applying the general commercial law, and that law 
itself derived its norms from the customs of merchants engaged in commercial 
intercourse.162 When Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins163 overruled Swift, it hardly rejected 
this process of incorporation; rather, it required federal courts to defer more strictly to the 
practices of the several states, which had themselves incorporated the lex mercatoria and 
the common law.164 And in cases where courts continue to make federal common law based 
on the presence of uniquely federal interests, they have continued to draw on the general 
commercial law.165 
 Federal courts law incorporates the English common law and equitable practice, as 
well as the broader customs of maritime and commercial law, as a pragmatic solution to 
the generality of the Article III judicial power and its instantiation in the various judiciary 
acts. The Framers of these mandates left innumerable questions unanswered, and they 
could afford to do so because the common law background either already answered them 
or provided resources to do so in the future. As Peter Du Ponceau put it in the early 
Nineteenth Century, “[w] live in the midst of the common law, we inhale it at every breath, 
imbibe it at every pore . . . [and] cannot learn another system of laws without learning at 
                                                 
practices from earliest times to the present, which have had no international boundaries and which exist in 
any particular jurisdiction unless limited or excluded by a particular statute.”). 
159 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) 
160 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789). 
161 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19; see generally William Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513 (1984); Jay, Federal 
Common Law II, supra note 104, at 1263-64. 
162 See, e.g., RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW: THE 
DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM (1977) (describing the customary 
character of the general commercial law). 
163 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
164 See generally Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J. L. ECON. & 
POL’Y 17 (2013). 
165 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (concluding that “the federal 
law merchant . . . stands as a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal rules applicable to these 
federal questions”). 
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the same time another language.”166 Rebels against British rule, the founding generation 
nonetheless saw little need—and perhaps had little ability—to remodel the entire legal 
system; instead, the preexisting law shaped the new government at every turn.167 Federal 
courts law maintains this basic conservatism today, preferring in nearly every instance “off 
the shelf” solutions based on some preexisting source of law to formulating new legal rules 
out of whole cloth.168 
 This sort of incorporation is by no means confined to federal courts law, of course. 
Search and seizure law, for example, incorporates important elements of the common law 
of property. In assessing the reasonableness of a search, the Court has noted “the great 
significance given to widely shared social expectations, which are naturally enough 
influenced by the law of property, but not controlled by its rules.”169 The substantive due 
process cases have frequently invoked common law principles in defining the “liberty” 
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.170 More broadly, the Court’s 
incorporation jurisprudence applying the Bill of Rights to the States relies not on Justice 
Black’s theory that the Fourteenth Amendment rendered the first eight amendments 
directly authoritative in state cases, but rather on the more indirect notion that the Bill of 
                                                 
166 PETER DU PONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 91 (1824). 
167 See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 104, at 67 (“There is no evidence that any of the men who led Massachusetts 
into the War of Independence or any of those who followed acted for the purpose of bringing about 
fundamental changes in the rules and institutions of which the legal system was comprised. . . . The legal 
system that emerged from the war was, in short, virtually identical to the old colonial legal system.”); Sachs, 
supra note 105, at 1821-23. Professor Nelson goes on to document that “thereafter change was dramatic,” 
id., but these changes had to do with adapting the common law to the needs of the growing republic and 
important shifts in the responsibilities of judge and jury; there was no wholesale rejection of English law. See 
id. at 8-10, 165-74. 
168 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 41, at 747-52 (discussing the practice of supplying limitations 
periods for federal causes of action that lack them by borrowing from analogous state statutes of limitation). 
State law qualifies as a “practice” in this context, because it is “borrowed” in situations in which it lacks 
direct legal force. Such state law practices may or may not be of longstanding duration. Similar borrowing 
also takes place to resolve ambiguities in federal statutory terms. See, e.g., Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 
(1995) (“It is . . . well established that ‘[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning 
under ... the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to 
incorporate the established meaning of these terms.’”) (quoting community for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)).  
169 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006). See also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-51 
(2012) (acknowledging the reliance of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on the common law of trespass); 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 124, 144 n.12 (noting that “reference to real or personal property law” can ground 
a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 
170 See, e.g., Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990) (relying 
on the common law doctrine of informed consent to identify a “liberty interest” in refusing life-sustaining 
medical treatment); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (stating that “the legal issue in the 
present case reduces to whether the relationship between persons [here] has been treated as a protected family 
unit under the historic practices of our society,” and looking to the common law to define those practices). 
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Rights provides a helpful guide to identifying the principles of “fundamental fairness” that 
the Fourteenth Amendment protects.171 As the younger Justice Harlan put it, “the Bill of 
Rights is evidence . . . of the content Americans find in the term ‘liberty’ and of American 
standards of fundamental fairness.”172 
 My friend and colleague Stephen Sachs has described our English inheritance of 
the common law and equity principles as a “constitutional backdrop.” He rightly observes 
that “[o]ur founding document is firmly rooted in the common law tradition, in which each 
new enactment is layered on top of an existing and enormously complex body of written 
and unwritten law.”173 Professor Sachs’s discussion is tremendously helpful in illuminating 
the extent to which our legal system in general—and constitutional law in particular—
builds on a body of preexisting legal principles and practices. But exploring the 
divergences between Sachs’s account and my own will help illuminate the approach 
advanced here.   
 A “backdrop,” as Professor Sachs uses the term, is not “historical practice” as I 
have defined it. An historical practice, for my purposes, is a prior action or rule that does 
not bind directly within the context of the dispute in which it is invoked. The Constitution 
itself is not “practice,” because it binds us today as law; neither are the portions of the 1789 
Judiciary Act that remain in effect today. But the early Presidents’ tendency to issue 
Thanksgiving Day proclamations is a practice that might be relevant to contemporary 
disputes about the meaning of the Establishment Clause, because they may reflect a 
longstanding view about the permissibility of official invocations of the Deity.174 At the 
same time, of course, those proclamations themselves have no binding force in 
contemporary Establishment Clause litigation.  
For Professor Sachs, legal backdrops are relevant precisely because they continue 
to have binding legal force today.  Because “the Constitution left most preexisting law 
alone,” he says, “[a]ny legal rule that wasn’t abrogated by the Constitution’s enactment 
simply kept on trucking after 1788.”175  Hence, the English Common law, equity practice, 
and other bodies of preexisting law “remained in force subject to the Constitution’s 
requirements, to the privileged status of federal law under the Supremacy Clause, and to 
the ordinary processes of abrogation, amendment, and repeal.”176 For Sachs, the common 
law is relevant because it simply remains the law—not because it is a practice that may 
                                                 
171 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759-66 (2010). 
172 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 177 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
173 Id. at 1822. 
174 Compare, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 622-25 (1992), with id. at 633-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(debating the significance of Thanksgiving proclamations for the Establishment Clause). 
175 Sachs, supra note 105, at 1823. 
176 Id. 
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influence the interpretation of existing law or, in some way, supplement the traditionally-
binding legal materials. Moreover, what makes the common law a constitutional backdrop 
is that it is “preserved from change” in various ways.177 
 Certainly some aspects of the common law, equity practice, or other forms of 
preexisting law have continuing force in our legal system.178 But the transition from 
English to American law was not seamless,179 and it differed at the national and state levels. 
The states did not simply allow the English common law to continue in force. Rather, they 
expressly “received” it into state law through specific reception statutes or provisions in 
state constitutions,180 and they took only those portions they found applicable to their local 
conditions.181 And the framers of the national Constitution explicitly debated—but 
rejected—a parallel reception of the English common law into national law.182 Writing to 
St. George Tucker, John Marshall stated that “I do not believe one man can be found” who 
maintains “that the common law of England has . . . been adopted as the common law of 
America by the Constitution of the United States.”183 Nor is there any federal statute 
                                                 
177 Id. 
178 For example, Professor Sachs cites longstanding customary international law rules governing interstate 
borders, which not only have continuing legal force but are effectively insulated from change by 
constitutional prohibitions on reassigning territory from one state to another. See id. at 1828-34. 
179 See generally Hall, supra note 102, at 805-07; PAUL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY 
AMERICAN COLONIES 58 (1899) (“The process which we may call the reception of the English common law 
by the colonies was not so simple as the legal theory would lead us to assume. While their general legal 
conceptions were conditioned by, and their terminology derived from, the common law, the early colonists 
were far from applying it as a technical system, they often ignored it or denied its subsidiary force, and they 
consciously departed from many of its most essential principles.”).   
180 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-1 (“All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and 
use within this State, or so much of the common law as is not destructive of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent 
with, the freedom and independence of this State and the form of government therein established, and which 
has not been otherwise provided for in whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, are 
hereby declared to be in full force within this State.”); see generally Hall, supra note 102. One state received 
the common law through judicial decision. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Walker, 21 Conn. 168, 181 (1851) (“We 
have, in our judicial practice, adopted so much of the common law as was operative as law, in the father-
land, when our ancestors left it, and which was adapted to the new state of things here, under our colonial 
condition. This was our inheritance.”). 
181 See, e.g., Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829) (Story, J.) (“The common law of England 
is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, 
and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that portion which was 
applicable to their situation.”); ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 20 (1938) (noting 
that “[l]egislatures and courts and doctrinal writers had to test the common law at every point with respect to 
its applicability to America”). 
182 See Jay, Federal Common Law Part II, supra note 104, at 1254-62; see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 137-42 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing this history). 
183 Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker, Nov. 27, 1800, reprinted in Jay Federal Common Law 
Part II, supra note 104, App. A, at 1326; see also James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, House 
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receiving the common law en masse into national law. Hence, the Supreme Court in 
Wheaton v. Peters found it “clear there can be no common law of the United States. . . . 
The common law could be made a part of our federal system only by legislative adoption. 
When, therefore, a common law right is asserted, we must look to the state in which the 
controversy originated.”184 
 English rules of common law and equity, as well as the broader corpus of maritime 
law, thus do not become part of federal law because they simply remained in force 
notwithstanding “the late unpleasantness”—to borrow a Civil War euphemism—between 
Britain and its American colonies. Rather, they come in because particular provisions of 
federal law, such as the Process Acts or the Admiralty Clause in Article III, adopted them, 
or because federal judges, using their more limited authority to adopt federal common law 
rules to govern the cases before them, imported them as helpful “off-the-shelf” solutions 
to problems arising in federal litigation. As such, these older bodies of law were practices, 
whose legal force depended on a current decision to accept them as binding. In most 
situations, this conceptual hair-splitting will make little difference. But it does matter when 
aspects of the English “backdrop” are argued to be entrenched against change by ordinary 
legal means185—a problem I return to in Part III.   
 Incorporation of preexisting bodies of law may have a dynamic as well as a 
conservative impact on the law. Just as state courts used the common lawmaking powers 
that they received along with the substantive English common law to adapt that law to the 
context of the growing American states,186 so too federal court law has adapted as it adopted 
preexisting bodies of law. The federal Constitution explicitly incorporated the English 
                                                 
of Delegates, Session of 1799–1800, Concerning Alien and Sedition Laws, in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 
381 (G. Hunt ed. 1906) (rejecting any general reception of the common law into federal law). 
184 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834). Professor Sachs writes that “the decision in Wheaton didn’t actually get 
rid of the “common law of the United States,” citing admiralty law as a counter-example. Sachs, supra note 
105, at 1883. But maritime law was not treated as federal law until the Supreme Court’s much-criticized 
decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). See Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note 
158, at 319-25; Fletcher, supra note 161, at 1549.  Moreover, maritime law has not generally been understood 
as synonymous with “common law.” See also Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 
354, 364-66 (1959) (holding that “admiralty” is a distinct class of jurisdiction from “suits . . . at common law 
or in equity . . . arising under the . . . laws of the United States”); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: 
A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1280-83 (1996) (demonstrating maritime law’s roots 
in customary international law); Tetley, supra note 158, at 109-14 (documenting the origins of maritime law 
in the law of nations). Likewise, it is relatively well settled that the general commercial law applied under 
Swift v. Tyson was not considered federal. See Fletcher, supra note 161, at 1575. Its force depended on state 
choice of law rules mandating its application in commercial cases. See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 
162, at 72-73. 
185 See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 105, at 1816, 1878 (arguing that backdrops are insulated against most kinds 
of legal change); id. at 1873-75 (suggesting that the English common law doctrine of sovereign immunity is 
immune from congressional abrogation). 
186 See NELSON, supra note 104, at 8-10. 
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common law writ of habeas corpus as a restraint on executive detention,187 but the 
Reconstruction Congress extended the writ to persons in state custody and the Supreme 
Court ultimately interpreted it as a basis for collateral attack on state convictions188—a 
remedy directed to the unique problems of American federalism. English admiralty law 
extended only to tidal waters, but American law stretched it to cover all navigable 
waterways by 1851, which had the intended effect of extending federal maritime 
jurisdiction to cover a broad swath of interstate commerce.189 And the Supreme Court has 
both received and adapted the English common law of sovereign immunity—building upon 
such English remedies as the petition of right but then extending them to wholly new 
contexts, such as damages actions against law enforcement officers—to construct a 
relatively flexible array of remedies against government officials for constitutional 
violations.190  
 Federal courts law’s incorporation of preexisting bodies of law thus illustrates the 
flip-side of prescriptive authority, that is, its pairing of respect for the past with enablement 
of incremental change and reform. The most eloquent account of “living constitutionalism” 
in American law, the younger Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman,191 is grounded 
                                                 
187 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 81-82 (conferring authority on the 
federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus for prisoners in federal custody).  
188 See Act of February 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see also HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 41, at1194 (“[P]ostconviction relief was not the original office of habeas corpus, 
which focused instead on whether extra-judicial detention—most often by the executive—was authorized by 
law.”). 
189 See generally Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth 
Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1215-26 (1954). 
190 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 196 (1882) (recognizing that the national government 
inherited the English crown’s immunity at common law, but holding by analogy to the petition of right that 
this immunity did not bar suits against officers for prospective relief); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) 
(extending officer suits to state officers and claims for prospective relief that do not rest on invasion of a 
common law interest); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (invoking “the distinctive historical traditions of equity as an institution” 
to affirm the federal courts’ power to recognize other remedies, including damages relief, against federal 
officers for constitutional violations). 
191 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds). Justice Harlan 
wrote: 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to 
any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has 
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the 
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying 
of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not 
been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The 
balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches 
are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition 
is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, 
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squarely in the common law method. By incorporating preexisting bodies of law that 
themselves presuppose a strong role for judicial elaboration over time, this form of reliance 
on past practice also injects a degree of fluidity into federal courts doctrine. 
C. Canons of Statutory Construction 
 The canons of statutory construction defer to historical practice in at least three 
senses.  The first is that most of these rules themselves represent venerable traditions of 
interpretation. Abbe Gluck’s recent work has investigated the fascinating and difficult 
question whether methodologies of statutory construction are themselves law—so that, for 
instance, federal courts interpreting state statutes would be required to apply state canons 
of construction.192 But whether or not that is true, there is no doubt that the canons also 
represent longstanding regularities of practice within the judiciary.193 Federal courts apply 
the canons because previous courts have applied those canons. And the stability of the 
canons is thought to provide a baseline against which Congress can legislate.194 
 The second and third ways in which the canons defer to historical practice turn on 
the nature of the canon in question. The statutory interpretation literature generally divides 
rules of interpretation into two classes: descriptive canons, which embody judgments about 
how the enacting legislature most likely would have preferred to resolve ambiguities that 
arise within a statute; and normative canons, which implement other values that the 
                                                 
while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as 
a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint. 
Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1992) (plurality opinion of 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (adopting Harlan’s reasoning); Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, 
supra note 40, at 695 (arguing that “Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe demonstrates the application of the 
common-law model [of constitutionalism] to resolve actual cases”). 
192 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 
120 YALE. L. J. 1898 (2011). 
193 See, e.g., Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L. J. 341, 344-
45 (2010) (discussing the canons as a form of customary law). 
194 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531 
n.22 (1983) (“Congress ... appear[s] to have been generally aware that the statute would be construed by 
common-law courts in accordance with traditional canons.”); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 517 (making this point about the Chevron rule 
construing statutory ambiguity as legislative intent to delegate interpretive authority to agencies). Scholars 
have questioned whether legislators are actually aware of judicial canons of statutory construction—and thus 
whether those canons can function as a baseline in this way. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, 
The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002). But the 
most recent empirical work on that subject suggests a higher degree of legislative awareness of the canons 
than the earlier academic conventional wisdom supposed. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and 
the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 929 (2013). 
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legislature may or may not share.195 Descriptive canons generally seek to assess legislative 
preferences by reference to regularities in past legislative practice—the judgment, for 
example, that when the legislature passes a new statute, it generally does not mean to 
disrupt other aspects of the law unless it specifically says that it does. These canons thus 
embody deference to past legislative practice.  
Normative canons, on the other hand, are problematic precisely because they so 
often fly in the face of likely legislative preference.196 The rule of lenity, for example, holds 
that “when there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, 
we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite 
language.”197 This approach cannot, to put it mildly, plausibly rest on a judgment that 
legislators generally look out for and mean to protect the interests of criminal defendants; 
rather, it is traditionally justified as protecting due process values of fair notice.198 As the 
rule of lenity suggests, sometimes normative canons trace directly to constitutional 
principles. Often, however, the values protected are more diffuse. The rule disfavoring 
repeals of preexisting law by implication from a new statute,199 for example, is hard to 
ground in any specific constitutional principle. 
David Shapiro has demonstrated, however, that canons like the one against implied 
repeals serve a broader function of maintaining continuity and coherence in the law. For 
Professor Shapiro, the most important interpretive canons “are those that aid in reading 
statutes against the entire background of existing customs, practices, rights, and 
obligations—in other words, those that emphasize the importance of not changing existing 
understandings any more than is needed to implement the statutory objective.”200 This view 
of the canons takes in those rules of construction, like the rule of lenity or the presumption 
against preemption,201 that point to specific constitutional principles, because those canons 
harmonize new laws with those principles without forcing an evaluation of actual 
                                                 
195 See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes 
to You? 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, 
and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1586-87 (2000). 
196 See Ross, supra note 195, at 563; see also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory 
Interpretation, 78 Geo. L. J. 389-90 (1989) (suggesting that these sorts of canons raise legitimacy problems 
as a form of judicial lawmaking). 
197 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987). 
198 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 332 (2000). 
199 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984) (“[W]here two statutes are capable of 
co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to 
regard each as effective” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
200 David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 921, 925 (1992). 
201 See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
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constitutional conflict.202 But as the rule against implied repeals suggests, Shapiro’s notion 
of coherence also includes integration with the vast mass of preexisting subconstitutional 
law.203 The canons respect the fact that subconstitutional law often plays a critical role in 
constituting our institutions, so that a repeal of a preexisting statute, regulation, or common 
law doctrine may be just as disruptive as a statute that undermines some constitutional 
value.204 
 Professor Shapiro’s notion of statutory construction as an instrument of continuity 
with past practice is nowhere more apparent than with respect to statutes construing the 
authority of the federal courts. In Murdock v. Memphis,205 the Supreme Court construed an 
amendment to the statutory section prescribing the Court’s jurisdiction over appeals from 
the state courts to permit only review of federal questions, not any state law issues that 
might also be necessary to resolve the entire dispute. It did so notwithstanding a recent 
amendment that arguably broadened the Court’s jurisdiction, noting that if it were Congress 
intent to “revers[e] the policy of the government from its foundation in one of the most 
important subjects on which [Congress] could act, it is reasonably to be expected that 
Congress would use plain, unmistakable language in giving expression to such 
intention.”206  
A different result in Murdock would have disrupted the established relationship 
between state and federal law. As Martha Field has explained, if the U.S. Supreme Court 
could substitute its own view of state law for that of the highest state court, “it would not 
be possible to identify any body of law as ‘state law.’ It is thus because of Murdock that 
the whole concept of state law as distinct from federal law is a meaningful one.”207 While 
Murdock purported only to construe the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional statute, then, it is a 
profoundly constitutive decision; it is, as Professor Field observes, “such a fundamental 
part of our way of thinking about the boundary between state and federal power that many 
of our suppositions, constitutional and otherwise, are built upon it.”208 The Court’s 
                                                 
202 See Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay for Phil 
Frickey, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1371 (2010). 
203 See, e.g., Norfolk Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35 
(1983) (“It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that ‘[t]he common law ... ought not to be 
deemed repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose.’”) (quoting Fairfax's 
Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623 (1812)). 
204 See also Sachs, supra note 105, at 1838-43 (discussing the notion of “defeasibility” in integrating new 
law with preexisting arrangements). 
205 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). 
206 Id. at 619. 
207 Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 922 (1986). 
208 Id. at 920. 
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construction of the statutory amendment was thus predicated on the need to ensure 
continuity with this broader web of past (and ongoing) practices.  
Likewise, the Court’s jurisdiction-stripping precedents—which consistently 
construe jurisdictional statutes in such a way as to minimize encroachments on the 
longstanding scope of federal jurisdiction—demonstrate the strength of the continuity 
impulse even in the teeth of aggressive new statutory language. 209 In INS v. St. Cyr,210 for 
example, the Court confronted a statutory text that seemed unequivocally to deprive federal 
courts of jurisdiction to review deportation orders. The Illegal immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) provided that “[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal 
against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” certain enumerated 
criminal offenses.”211 Nonetheless, the Court found that this provision was not sufficiently 
clear to proscribe review by writ of habeas corpus. “[T]o conclude that the writ is no longer 
available in this context would represent a departure from historical practice in immigration 
law,” the Court said, noting that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus has always been available to 
review the legality of Executive detention.”212 Moreover, the Court’s prior precedents had 
demanded explicit textual references to habeas corpus in order to foreclose that remedy—
a reference that, for all its aggressive language, the IIRIRA provision failed to include.213 
 Amanda Tyler has explained that St. Cyr and similar cases rely on “a combination 
of the canon against implied repeals and a clear statement rule protecting structural 
harmony, as well as a heavy dose of stare decisis—namely, continuing and strong reliance 
on the model set forth in Yerger.”214 One might also think of the Court’s requirement of a 
super-strong clear statement in order to cut off federal jurisdiction as embodying a 
constitutional norm against jurisdiction stripping, albeit one defeasible by Congress if it 
acts with sufficient clarity.215 These two views are not necessarily in tension. Hard 
                                                 
209 See, e.g., Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868) (construing 1868 statute depriving the U.S. Supreme 
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constitutional limits on jurisdiction-stripping are hard to identify,216 and the strongest 
arguments against such measures will generally be that they fly in the face of centuries of 
institutional practice concerning the relationship between Congress, the federal courts, and 
the courts of the states.217 The canons of construction, in Professor Shapiro’s model, exist 
primarily as a means for ensuring that new legislation does not unduly disrupt such 
practices. What cases like St. Cyr illustrate most vividly is that the canons may be employed 
to enforce such continuity even in the teeth of what Congress almost surely intends.218  
Of course, not everyone accepts Professor Shapiro’s view of statutory construction 
as a means primarily of maintaining continuity with the past. As Professor Tyler points out, 
“proponents of an engineering vision of courts in the realm of statutory interpretation 
generally contend for an interpretive approach by which courts ‘update’ the legislature’s 
work and absolve that body of the need to police judicial constructions that may no longer 
remain in keeping with prevailing political or social norms.”219 William Eskridge thus 
argues that statutes “should—like the Constitution and the common law—be interpreted 
‘dynamically,’ that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal context.”220  
But as Professor Eskridge’s invocation of the common law suggests, even 
“dynamic” takes on statutory interpretation are not fundamentally inconsistent with an 
emphasis on continuity with past practice. In Burke’s thought, organic growth is the 
flipside of prescriptive authority. For Burke, “the idea of inheritance furnishes a pure 
principle of conservation, and a sure principle of transmission, without at all excluding a 
principle of improvement.”221 In Swift v. Tyson,222 for example, Justice Story construed the 
Rules of Decision Act to be consistent with preexisting practice—in both America and 
elsewhere—extracting a general body of commercial law principles from the customs of 
                                                 
216 See id. at 1553-73; see also Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
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217 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 216, at 1038-39 (concluding that certain restrictions on the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction would “violate the spirit of the Constitution [by disrupting longstanding assumptions 
about the Court’s role] even if it would not violate its letter”). 
218 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay for 
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merchants.223 Maintaining continuity with that longstanding practice also solidified the 
dynamic role of the federal courts in developing a nationally uniform body of commercial 
principles.224  
But Burke insisted on an incremental method of change in which "[b]y “slow but 
well-sustained progress, the effect of each step is watched,” and that any reforms 
“procee[d] upon the principle of reference to antiquity . . . [and] be carefully formed upon 
analogical precedent, authority, and example.”225 As later students of Burke have pointed 
out, this is the method of the common law tradition, whereby “custom was constantly being 
subjected to the test of experience, so that if immemorial it was, equally, always up to 
date.”226 Justice Story’s general commercial law, for example, was tied to and disciplined 
by existing practice and the need to coordinate with other courts applying the same body 
of law.227 Much as the common law tradition has frequently facilitated organic growth in 
American constitutionalism,228 so too the canons of interpretation have facilitated 
institutional change by cushioning the shocks that might otherwise deter or short-circuit 
reform.229 
III. The Constitutive and Entrenchment Effects of Practice 
 The doctrines just discussed hardly exhaust the many ways in which federal courts 
law incorporates and defers to historical practice. Indeed, I have left out many of the more 
prominent examples in order to shine some light on instances where the dynamic may be 
less obvious. But the examples I have highlighted are enough, I think, to support a few 
more general points about deference to historical practice in this area. Crucially, federal 
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courts law uses historical practice in ways that diverge from its use in high-profile 
separation of powers disputes like Noel Canning and Zivotofsky. It is, I suggest, a mistake 
to focus only on these “big cases.” 
 Two points of divergence are critical. First, federal courts law uses practice 
primarily to supplement and fill gaps in other sources of binding law—not to “gloss” the 
meaning of particular constitutional provisions. Largely because of this, federal courts law 
rarely entrenches past practice against change by ordinary legal means. Second, federal 
courts law generally does not rely on some theory of acquiescence by the other branches 
to justify reliance on past practice. In many settings, such acquiescence seems largely 
beside the point. Instead, the examples I have canvassed tend to rely on practice based on 
its longstanding pedigree. Federal courts law thus embraces—albeit often implicitly—a 
prescriptive rationale for past practice. I argue below that this rationale is normatively 
superior to an acquiescence model of historical practice. 
A. The Non-Entrenchment of Practice in Federal Courts Law 
The vast majority of historical practices I have surveyed help constitute our judicial 
institutions—and in this sense properly fall under the rubric of “constitutional” 
interpretation—without entrenching those practices against change by ordinary political 
processes. The constitutive and entrenchment functions of constitutional law do not 
necessarily run together, and in federal courts law one frequently sees the former without 
the latter. This is true of each set of practices surveyed in the preceding Part. 
The common law, for example, has generally been defeasible by statute; indeed, it 
was generally received into American law under the express condition that this would be 
so.230 Both state and federal legislatures have interstitially supplanted that body of law as 
they deemed necessary.231 Specific imports—such as the common law immunities of 
individual government officers or the equitable principles built into the abstention 
doctrines—can be modified or repealed by legislation.232 Likewise, both the general 
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maritime law and the general commercial law have often been altered or superseded by 
federal and state legislation.233 
The canons of construction are likewise largely unentrenched. This is obviously 
true with respect to the canons’ impact on construction of particular statutes; where canons 
grounded in established practice influence the construction of a statute, Congress may 
override the courts’ work.234 The same thing is generally true of the canons themselves. 
Certainly the courts themselves change the canons over time, employing them more 
insistently in some eras than others, creating new canons from time to time, and allowing 
others to fall into disuse. To the considerable extent that descriptive canons of construction 
reflect patterns of legislative practice, they necessarily change as that practice changes over 
time.235 Congress is able to control the process of interpretation by legislating general rules 
of construction (although these are often ignored)236 and by enacting interpretive principles 
in particular statutes.237  
The harder question is whether Congress may override particular normative 
canons—particularly those grounded in constitutional values. Although I cannot develop 
the point here, an attempt to prevent the courts from considering constitutional principles 
in statutory cases would present grave separation of powers concerns.238 When Congress 
has effectively sought to do so, its actions seem best understood not as precluding the courts 
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from considering the constitution but as either an exercise of its considerable power over 
remedies or a restriction on the courts’ jurisdiction to decide a class of cases at all. But the 
critical point remains that canons set only default rules, and so Congress can always 
overcome them simply by clearly expressing its intent. In this ultimate sense, no canon is 
entrenched. 
Judicial precedent presents a more difficult case. We must consider, first, the 
practice of stare decisis itself, and second, the entrenchment of particular decisions. 
Scholars have debated whether Congress may override the doctrine of stare decisis by 
statute.239 If there is a limit on this option, however, it seems likely to stem from general 
separation of powers concerns about the encroachment of one branch into the functions of 
another—not from a notion that stare decisis is itself constitutionally entrenched. Certainly 
courts have long felt free to tailor the rules of stare decisis to particular situations and to 
set the force of precedent aside under particular circumstances. Even if some basic level of 
precedential force is constitutionally entrenched, that protection is unlikely to extend to the 
varied details of current practice with respect to precedents.   
What about the entrenchment of particular decisions? Most judicial precedents, of 
course, are not constitutional ones and thus can generally be altered or overridden by 
ordinary legislation.240 That is ordinarily not possible in constitutional cases,241 but the 
Court has compensated by lowering the threshold for judicial overruling of constitutional 
precedents.242 Moreover, the elements of the Court’s stare decisis calculus—especially the 
workability of the prior precedent and changes to its legal or factual underpinnings—speak 
directly to concerns about entrenchment of past practice in the face of a changing world.243 
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Constitutional precedents are largely entrenched against change from outside the Court, 
however,244 and that has made the Court’s frequent recourse to a common law-like 
approach to constitutional development controversial.245  
 Even in the context of high-profile inter-branch disputes, the Court has generally 
been reluctant to entrench practice against change through ordinary legislation. The 
Youngstown concurrences, for example, viewed presidential authority as largely a function 
of congressional authorization or prohibition. Both Justices Jackson and Frankfurter turned 
to past practice in service of that inquiry—that is, they looked to past practice to determine 
whether Congress had, in fact, authorized or prohibited the sort of executive action in 
question.246 But nothing in this approach entrenched the past practice against legislative 
change; even in areas where Congress had broadly authorized (or at least acquiesced in) 
executive action, Congress remained free to repeal that authorization and replace it with a 
prohibition.   
 However, the Court’s most recent presidential power decision—Zivotofsky v. 
Kerry247—goes a giant step further. In that case, the majority concluded from past practice 
not only that the President has authority to endorse or not endorse the claims of foreign 
sovereigns to particular territory, but also that this power is exclusive of Congress. 
Congress could not, in other words, limit the President’s authority by statute (as it had tried 
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to do with respect to passports of infants born in Jerusalem).248 The past practice of 
presidential recognition and congressional acquiescence had become constitutionally 
entrenched; presumably the only way to strip the President of this authority now would be 
to amend the Constitution.   
The primary analogy in federal courts law is the Court’s state sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence, which derives from longstanding common law practice a broad immunity 
against private suits that is not defeasible by federal legislation.249 One might be tempted 
to call this principle of immunity a “gloss” on the text of the Eleventh Amendment, but the 
Court has clearly ruled out that interpretation. As Justice Kennedy has said, the phrase 
“Eleventh Amendment immunity” is “convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, 
for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms 
of the Eleventh Amendment.”250 Rather, the principle of immunity supplements the text; it 
is “a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification 
of the Constitution, and which they retain today.”251 
This is not the place to renew old debates about the soundness of the Court’s state 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. It is sufficient to say that the Court’s position is highly 
controversial both on the Court and in the academy.252 Justice Stevens has written, for 
example, that “[t]he kind of judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole Tribe 
[and]  Alden v. Maine . . . represents such a radical departure from the proper role of this 
Court that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises.”253 I submit that an 
important driver of this controversy is the Court’s attempt to confer on freestanding 
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historical practice the same constitutionally-entrenched status as the constitutional text 
itself. The Court has reached “[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions,” as it 
said in Monaco v. Mississippi, for “postulates which limit and control” based in common 
law practice254—and it has entrenched those postulates against legislative alteration. As 
Justice Souter pointed out in Seminole Tribe, the Court’s state immunity cases share the 
“characteristic vice” of Lochner v. New York,255 in which the Court “treated the common-
la background . . . as paramount, while regarding congressional legislation to abrogate the 
common law . . . as constitutionally suspect.”256  
I suspect that Zivotofsky, which featured the same basic notion of presidential power 
immune from legislative limitation that one finds in the infamous Bush administration 
“torture memos,”257 will prove similarly controversial. Entrenching practice raises a 
particularly difficult boundary problem that has bedeviled most practice-based theories of 
constitutional law.258 If some practices are to have constitutional status, then it becomes 
critical to define with precision which practices are entrenched and which are not—and to 
justify the status of the favored practices. It is often exceedingly difficult to draw that line, 
and failure to draw it in a determinate and predictable way may well undermine the Court’s 
legitimacy.259 
This problem either does not arise or arises in a considerably more tractable form 
when practices supplement other sources of law, but remain defeasible by ordinary 
legislation. That is why it is often helpful to decouple the constitutive function of extra-
constitutional materials, like practice, from any claim to an entrenchment function. I do not 
mean to suggest that all doctrines that both supplement the constitutional text by reliance 
on practice and entrench that practice against change through ordinary legal processes are 
misguided. My point is simply that such instances will always be more vulnerable to 
general criticisms of reliance on historical practice, such as arguments that such reliance 
amounts to “constitutional adverse possession,” that it unduly freezes the progressive 
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development of the law, or conversely that it provides ready fodder for judge-driven 
constitutional change. I consider these criticisms in greater detail in the next section. 
B. Acquiescence and Prescription 
 The use of past practice in federal courts cases often displays a second difference 
from its use in high-profile inter-branch controversies like Noel Canning and Zivotofsky. 
In the latter sort of case, courts often ground the authority of past practice in the 
acquiescence of rival branches.260 The Zivotofsky court, for example, found that “[f]rom 
the first Administration forward, the President has claimed unilateral authority to recognize 
foreign sovereigns,” and “[f]or the most part, Congress has acquiesced in the Executive’s 
exercise of the recognition power.”261 This is not new. In Youngstown, for instance, Justice 
Frankfurter emphasized the weight of presidential practice “long pursued to the knowledge 
of the Congress and never before questioned.”262 Scholars have generally approved of this 
practice. My colleague Jeff Powell, for example, has written that “[a]greement between the 
political branches on a course of conduct is important evidence that the conduct should be 
deemed constitutional.”263 
Acquiescence plays a considerably less central role in federal courts cases. The 
basic limitation on federal judicial power—subject matter jurisdiction—is particularly 
hostile to any notion of acquiescence. “[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of 
the judicial power of the United States is inflexible and without exception, which requires 
this court, of its own motion, to deny its jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of its appellate 
power, that of all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does 
not affirmatively appear in the record.”264 This means that “no action of the parties can 
confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus, the consent of the parties is 
irrelevant, principles of estoppel do not apply, and a party does not waive the requirement 
by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the proceedings.”265 As a result, “[e]very federal 
appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but 
also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even though the parties are prepared 
to concede it.”266 As with the parties, so too with Congress: the Court has made clear that 
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Congress may not—by deliberate act, much less by acquiescence—confer federal 
jurisdiction that Article III does not permit.267 
Many federal courts cases do involve inter-institutional conflicts at some level, but 
either the nature of those conflicts or the posture in which they arise may make 
acquiescence less salient. For example, the Seminole Tribe case268 held that Congress may 
not abrogate state sovereign immunity when it uses its general legislative powers under 
Article I; it thus adjusted the allocation of power between Congress and the States. But the 
opinions in that case do not speak of acquiescence. Perhaps this is because acquiescence is 
more difficult to measure when it involves the actions of the fifty States vis-à-vis Congress. 
Or perhaps it is because although abrogation of sovereign immunity implicates the power 
of Congress over the States, it most directly affects the rights of individual plaintiffs suing 
the government. We do not generally look to acquiescence to establish the Government’s 
rights and immunities vis-à-vis individuals. Many instances where courts rely on past 
practice in federal courts cases—such as the individual officer immunity cases or the 
abstention cases—involve individual rights claims where it would seem odd to allow 
Congress’s acquiescence to diminish the rights of private plaintiffs.269 
Most cases involving the judicial power implicate both structural and individual 
rights concerns in this way. As the Court recognized in Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission v. Schor,270 for example, Article III “serves both to protect ‘the role of the 
independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government’ and to 
safeguard litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential 
domination by other branches of government.’”271 Schor and similar cases have held the 
individual interest to be waivable, but only by the individual litigant.272 And the structural 
interest is generally treated as non-waivable by such litigants.273 
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Waiver of structural interests by the acquiescence of institutional actors is a more 
mixed bag. In the conditional spending cases, for example, the Court has allowed states to 
agree to statutory conditions that Congress could not impose directly without violating 
principles of federalism.274 But the Court’s federalism cases have also rejected arguments 
from acquiescence. In New York v. United States,275 for example, the Court considered 
“what appears at first to be a troubling question: How can a federal statute be found an 
unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty when state officials consented to the 
statute’s enactment?” Justice O’Connor’s answer stemmed from the fundamental nature of 
structural principles: 
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit 
of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for 
the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the 
Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for 
the protection of individuals. . . . Where Congress exceeds its authority 
relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan 
cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.276 
Because structural principles benefit everyone, then, they cannot be waived or bargained 
away by office-holders in particular units of the government. 
One might argue that separation of powers and federalism are just different in this 
regard, perhaps because the branches of the federal government are coequal interpreters of 
the Constitution and (so the argument might go) the states are not. But Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion in New York explicitly equated federalism and separation of powers, insisting that 
“[t]he Constitution’s division of power among the three branches is violated where one 
branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch 
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approves the encroachment.”277 Hence, “[t]he constitutional authority of Congress cannot 
be expanded by the ‘consent’ of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, 
whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States.”278 Tellingly, Congress’s decision 
to pass a law encroaching on its own powers has not generally prevented litigants from 
successfully challenging such a law on separation of powers grounds. In Clinton v. New 
York,279 for example, the Court struck down the line-item veto statute on separation of 
powers grounds notwithstanding Congress’s own decision to back the law. Concurring, 
Justice Kennedy wrote that “[i]t is no answer, of course, to say that Congress surrendered 
its authority by its own hand . . . . Abdication of responsibility is not part of the 
constitutional design.”280 
Broad notions of acquiescence are problematic for a second reason, grounded in the 
general inability of one Congress to bind its successors.281  As Justice Souter explained in 
United States v. Winstar,282 that principle derives from English political theory and practice 
but survives, in a more limited fashion, in America.283 Hence Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinion in Fletcher v. Peck284 accepted the general principle “that one legislature is 
competent to repeal any act which a former legislature was competent to pass; and that one 
legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.”285 The notion that any 
given Congress may, through a course of action or simply by inaction, permanently cede 
power to another branch seems to fly in the face of this venerable principle. As Justice 
Kennedy put it in the line-item veto case, “[t]he Constitution is a compact enduring for 
                                                 
277 505 U.S. at 182. 
278 Id. 
279 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
280 Id. at 451-52 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
281 Although the notion of “parliamentary sovereignty” is generally discussed in the context of legislative 
lawmaking, it is unclear why it would not apply to lawmaking by the other branches of government as well.  
We do not generally think that executive orders issued by one President bind his or her successors, and 
common law decisions of one court can generally be reversed by a later tribunal. Congress can, of course, 
bind future incarnations of the other branches, but those branches are similarly limited in their ability to bind 
future versions of themselves. 
282 518 U.S. 839 (1996). 
283 See id. at 872 (plurality opinion) (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 90, at *90 (“Acts of parliament 
derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not.... Because the legislature, being in truth the 
sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, 
which the prior legislature must have been, if it's [sic] ordinances could bind the present parliament.”)). 
284 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
285 Id. at 135. 
 50 
more than our time, and one Congress cannot yield up its own powers, much less those of 
other Congresses to follow.”286 
Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion in Fletcher recognized that America’s 
commitment to notions of higher law unknown in England necessarily imposed two crucial 
limits on parliamentary sovereignty. A legislature might create vested rights which a 
subsequent legislature must honor, and a legislature’s sovereignty is also limited more 
broadly by the requirements of the federal Constitution.287 One might thus argue that 
acquiescence is simply a tool for ascertaining the meaning of these constitutional 
limitations—not an attempt by current political actors to bind their successors outside the 
Constitution. But that argument only works if we treat governmental practices simply as 
potentially persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means, without conferring on 
those practices any independent power to fix or change that meaning. Acquiescence would 
thus merely add to the persuasiveness of a branch’s past interpretation of constitutional 
meaning, because an at-least-potentially rivalrous branch has concurred in that 
interpretation.288 
My sense is that cases like Zivotofsky tend to give past acquiescence more weight 
than this, and to that extent they raise considerable theoretical and practical difficulties. To 
the extent that post-ratification practice influences a court to choose a less plausible 
interpretation of a provision’s original meaning, one might object that such reliance 
amounts to a constitutional amendment outside Article V. Any use of practice raises 
problems of indeterminacy, but entrenching that practice against ordinary legal change 
raises the stakes considerably. And much of the writing on acquiescence has documented 
the advantage it affords to the more active branch. It is easy for the President to take actions 
establishing a particular practice, but because Congress generally cannot act without 
passing a law, it is difficult for it to affirmatively oppose presidential actions asserting 
executive prerogatives.289  
Conversely, political actors may be reluctant not to assert their prerogatives in 
particular instances for fear of establishing an adverse precedent. In 2002, for example, 
Vice President Richard Cheney invoked executive privilege and refused disclose details of 
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meetings that he held with officials from the troubled Enron Corporation.290 It is far from 
clear that anything scandalous transpired, but Cheney would have had significant 
incentives to invoke the privilege regardless, lest he set an adverse precedent that such 
meetings are not covered. These sorts of incentives exacerbate the difficulty of political 
compromise—a commodity that is already in short supply.  
The federal courts cases suggest a different ground for reliance on past practice. 
For the most part, federal courts cases seem to rely on past practice simply because it is 
past. Federal courts doctrine incorporates the common law and equity practice because it 
has been around for a long time and is already integrated into innumerable aspects of our 
law. The canons of statutory construction persist because they themselves represent a 
longstanding part of the process of construction and, equally important, they integrate new 
law with old law. And, as I have already discussed, the most persuasive judicial precedents 
are those that have been repeatedly reaffirmed and applied over long periods of time. 
Past practice thus enjoys prescriptive authority in this field.291 One might argue for 
this authority on any number of grounds. Burke argued that repeated and longstanding 
practices embodied a higher form of rationality, based on the concurrence of many minds 
over generations rather than the limited reason of present-day lawmakers.292 As David 
Strauss has written,  
The central traditionalist idea is that one should be very careful about 
rejecting judgments made by people who were acting reflectively and in 
good faith, especially when those judgments have been reaffirmed or at least 
accepted over time. Judgments of this kind embody not just serious thought 
by one group of people, or even one generation, but the accumulated 
wisdom of many generations.  They also reflect a kind of rough empiricism: 
they do not rest just on theoretical premises; rather, they have been tested 
over time, in a variety of circumstances, and have been found to be at least 
good enough.293 
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Others stress the disruptive effect of uprooting longstanding practices on settled 
expectations, as well as the difficulties of foreseeing all the potential consequences of such 
changes.294 Anthony Kronman has even argued that continuity with the social norms and 
projects of past generations is what distinguishes humans from animals.295 And still others 
have emphasized the sheer difficulty of undertaking anything new if one must constantly 
reinvent the wheel by reevaluating established ways of doing things.296 
I have little to add to these justifications here. My primary interest is in the frequent 
critiques of giving legal force to the past. I turn to those criticisms in the next section. 
C. Nonentrenchment and the Critique of Prescription 
Reliance on historical practice in constitutional law has been criticized from a 
number of different perspectives. Frequent critiques include the notions that employing 
past usage in constitutional interpretation results in a form of “constitutional adverse 
possession,” that respect for settled authority represents too great a concession to the “dead 
hand of the past,” and that—somewhat inconsistently with the first two critiques—allowing 
judges to invoke non-constitutional practices licenses judicial activism by conferring too 
much flexibility on judges. These are all criticisms worth taking seriously, and any court 
relying on historical practice would do well to keep them firmly in mind. The critical point, 
however, is that each of these critiques applies most strongly when past practice is elevated 
to the status of a constitutionally entrenched norm.  
   Take the “adverse possession” critique first. In Noel Canning, for example, 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence objected to the majority’s reliance on past practice to expand 
the scope of the President’s power to make recess appointments. “The majority justifies 
those atextual results on an adverse-possession theory of executive authority,” he 
complained, because “Presidents have long claimed the powers in question, and the Senate 
has not disputed those claims with sufficient vigor.”297 Rather than defend an adverse 
possession approach in principle, the majority unsurprisingly denied that this was what it 
was up to. And as my colleagues Curt Bradley and Neil Siegel have shown, there are 
important differences between the historical gloss approach approved in Noel Canning and 
the rule of adverse possession in property law.298 Most important, “[r]elying on historical 
practice to help resolve uncertainties about such allocations [of constitutional power] is 
different from allowing it to alter a clearly established allocation.”299 But it is not that 
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different. Just as canons of statutory construction play a significant role only when they 
cause a court to adopt a statutory reading contrary to what they would have adopted if they 
had applied only the other traditional sources of statutory meaning,300 so too historical 
practice is most significant when it tips the balance in favor of one constitutional 
interpretation rather than another.301 In such cases, practice changes constitutional meaning 
from what it would otherwise be—at least to some extent. 
Ambiguities plague the constitutional text, and courts often have to resolve them 
somehow. Hence, the more appropriate question may not be whether it is legitimate for 
historical usage to shape constitutional meaning but rather how past practice compares to 
other sources of constitutional meaning. But even from this perspective, there is something 
unattractive about the incentives that relying on practice gives to the various institutions of 
government to aggressively stake out their positions and maximize their own prerogatives. 
It is rather like allowing the foxes to design the security system for the henhouse. In this 
sense—the incentives that it gives to bad behavior—reliance on practice can resemble 
adverse possession.  
This objection is far more troubling, however, when the rights and prerogatives 
secured in this manner are perpetual—that is, when reliance on past practice entrenches 
that practice against alteration by ordinary legal means. Hence, it is important to Professor 
Bradley’s and Siegel’s qualified defense of practice in Noel Canning that it rarely confers 
rights of the President that Congress cannot regulate.302 They note that “in foreign affairs 
setting such as war powers, executive agreements, the termination of treaties, and the like, 
substantial historical practice supports unilateral presidential authority, but little practice 
establishes that Congress is disabled from restricting or regulating that authority.”303 The 
Court’s subsequent decision in Zivotofsky, of course, casts some doubt on this conclusion. 
But the federal courts doctrines I have surveyed here do have that character—that is, they 
employ past practice to supplement the constitutional text and set default rules, but they do 
not purport to elevate that practice to entrenched constitutional status. To my mind, this 
strikes the right balance between the need for some source of law to answer questions 
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unresolved in the constitutional text and the imperative to prevent (or at least mitigate) 
institutional self-aggrandizement. 
A second objection to prescription is—not surprisingly—that it is too conservative. 
One need not be a Jeffersonian intent on holding a revolution every generation to be 
troubled by the prospect of locking in past practice.304 For example, Justice Scalia 
suggested in Burnham v. Superior Court305 that procedural practices, such as “tag” 
jurisdiction, that have endured throughout our history are always consistent with “due 
process.” “The short of the matter,” Scalia said, “is that jurisdiction based on physical 
presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our 
legal system that define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”306 This drew a strong academic dissent from David Strauss, who 
argued that traditionalism “is not remotely an acceptable approach” because it would lock 
us in to any number of deplorable practices.307 
I have assessed general arguments against traditionalism elsewhere;308 for present 
purposes, two points are critical. First, as with “adverse possession,” concerns about the 
dead hand of past practice stifling innovation and change become radically less compelling 
when past practice is not constitutionally entrenched. The primary role of historical practice 
in federal courts law is to fill gaps—to supply procedures, remedies, or defenses that are 
necessary to constitute a functioning judicial system but unspecified in the constitutional 
text or the various judiciary acts. Far from embodying a “dead hand,” this sort of 
supplementation enables the legal system to live and function effectively.309 And with only 
rare exceptions—e.g., state sovereign immunity—these gap-fillers are not themselves 
entrenched against change through ordinary legislation. Moreover, the courts themselves 
have modified past practices in light of contemporary necessities.310 
Second, the past practices upon which federal courts doctrine relies are frequently 
themselves highly dynamic bodies of law. As Justice Scalia has noted, “[t]here is nothing 
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new or surprising in the proposition that our unchanging Constitution refers to other bodies 
of law that might themselves change.”311 Incorporating the common law or equity practice 
into various aspects of federal courts law not only facilitates the ability of that law to fulfill 
its (frequently progressive) purposes,312 but also incorporates a tradition of judicial 
innovation in response to changing institutional needs. Even if, for example, the canons of 
construction may blunt some of the impact of reformist legislation, the imperative to 
integrate reform with existing legal structures and norms may ultimately make reform more 
palatable by reducing its associated risk of disruption. And the common law vision of 
constitutional law defined primarily by judicial precedent has frequently helped 
constitutional law address changing social practices and conditions.313 
Five years after slamming Justice Scalia’s traditionalism as “just not an acceptable 
creed,”314 Professor Strauss wrote an important article advocating “Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation.”315 That article rejected claims that the common law is too 
conservative, noting that “at various periods in its history the common law has shown a 
great capacity for innovation.”316 My point is not to accuse one of our most thoughtful legal 
scholars of inconsistency; rather, he was—in a sense—right both times.317 Both the 
conservatism that Strauss criticized and the organic reformism that he praised are essential 
elements of Burke’s theory of prescription. If reliance on past practice rests on norms of 
prescription, then that may encourage courts to implement that reliance in the organic, 
incremental, and disciplined fashion that prescription celebrates. 
These observations, alas, play right into the third and final criticism of reliance on 
past practice—that far from being too conservative, it facilitates judicial activism by 
loosening the constraints on judicial reasoning.318 Certainly, the strong role for practice 
described here empowers judges by proliferating the sources to which they may turn in 
construing the constitutional text, and by condoning the use of practice to supplement that 
canonical text in unprovided-for areas. In this sense, reliance on practice risks replicating 
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the stock criticism of legislative history, which is that it is like “looking over a crowd and 
picking out your friends.”319 Hence, Judge Kozinski has argued that constitutionalizing 
past practices “will allow judges to pick and choose those ancient practices they find 
salutary as a matter of policy, and give them constitutional status.”320 On the other hand, 
the authority of established norms and practices is likely to rule out certain forms of 
activism, such as a reading of the Vesting Clause of Article I that invalidates the 
administrative state or a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that enforces Rawlsian 
egalitarianism.  
Reliance on practice is like any other modality of constitutional interpretation, in 
that it can get out of hand if not disciplined by the conventions of legal argument and the 
norms of the judicial craft.321 It is unclear that any theory of the sources of constitutional 
interpretation can truly constrain courts.322 What we can do is insist that most instances of 
judicial creativity remain subject to democratic checks. It is worth noting that Burke’s 
notion of prescription comes from a legal system built on a baseline of parliamentary 
sovereignty. Both the authority of tradition and the common law’s potential for organic 
growth and judicial creativity are tempered, in British law, by the democratic authority of 
Parliament to overrule traditions that are no longer useful or innovations that press too far. 
This comparative law point simply underscores the argument with which I began this 
Part—that is, that in most cases, historical practices should not be constitutionally 
entrenched unless they stem clearly and directly from the text of the Constitution. As long 
as that is true, excesses of both conservatism and activism will be subject to correction by 
later legislatures and courts.  
Conclusion 
Burkean invocations of prescription have always rung a bit strange in America.323 
Our Constitution is not, like Burke’s, “a prescriptive constitution . . . whose sole authority 
is that it has existed time out of mind.”324 Americans have, rather, a constitutive document 
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323 See generally Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 40, at 660-64 (discussing difficulties in 
translating Burke to America). 
324 Burke, Representation, supra note 21, at 487. 
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whose authority can be grounded in specific democratic exertions, with a canonical text 
that can be parsed and debated, and identifiable Framers whose intents and understandings 
can be plumbed. We have this arrangement, moreover, as the result of a revolution that 
was, at least in part, a rather emphatic rejection of the prescriptive force of longstanding 
British institutions.325 
Nonetheless, just as the new American nation adopted the English common law as 
a familiar, off-the-shelf set of default principles for the resolution of disputes after the 
Revolution, we have also adopted a broad tendency to rely on past practices to resolve 
present legal quandaries. This tendency is nowhere more evident than in the law of federal 
courts, which at every turn relies on extensive bodies of doctrinal precedents, incorporates 
preexisting bodies of law, and employs canons of statutory construction to harmonize new 
enactments with past practice. Although constitutional theory is beginning to wake up to 
the significance of historical practice as a distinctive modality of constitutional 
interpretation, theorists will do well not to overlook this body of law in favor of more high-
profile inter-branch disputes over the separation of powers.  Because federal courts law 
grounds its reliance on past usage in prescriptive authority and generally does not entrench 
practice against change through ordinary legislation, it provides a healthier model for how 
practice should figure across the board.  
                                                 
325 See, e.g., Schoolhouse Rock, No More Kings, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cAZ8QJgFHOg (visited Sept. 24, 2015).  
